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Abstract. ‘Type’ in biology is a polysemous term. In a landmark article, Paul Farber
(Journal of the History of Biology 9(1): 93–119, 1976) argued that this deceptively plain
term had acquired three diﬀerent meanings in early nineteenth century natural history
alone. ‘Type’ was used in relation to three distinct type concepts, each of them associated
with a diﬀerent set of practices. Important as Farber’s analysis has been for the
historiography of natural history, his account conceals an important dimension of early
nineteenth century ‘type talk.’ Farber’s taxonomy of type concepts passes over the fact
that certain uses of ‘type’ began to take on a new meaning in this period. At the closing
of the eighteenth century, terms like ‘type specimen,’ ‘type species,’ and ‘type genus’
were universally recognized as referring to typical, model members of their encom-
passing taxa. But in the course of the nineteenth century, the same terms were co-opted
for a diﬀerent purpose. As part of an eﬀort to drive out nomenclatural synonymy – the
confusing state of a taxon being known to diﬀerent people by diﬀerent names – these
terms started to signify the ﬁxed and potentially atypical name-bearing elements of taxa.
A new type concept was born: the nomenclatural type. In this article, I retrace this
perplexing nineteenth century shift in meaning of ‘type.’ I uncover the nomenclatural
disorder that the new nomenclatural type concept dissolved, and expose the conceptual
confusion it left in its tracks. What emerges is an account of how synonymy was
suppressed through the coinage of a homonym.
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Introduction
Nineteenth century natural history was rife with talk of ‘types’ in var-
ious guises. In a landmark article from 1976, historian of biology Paul
Farber set out to disentangle the web of connotations of this deceptively
plain term. He pointed out that ‘type’ in this period ‘‘was not a simple
notion. Rather, it was a constellation of concepts that zoologists em-
ployed in diﬀerent specialties, assigned to diﬀerent levels of organiza-
tion, and interpreted in diﬀerent ways’’ (Farber, 1976, p. 93). Farber
argued that the distinct usages of ‘type’ pointed towards three diﬀerent
‘type concepts’: the morphological type concept, the classiﬁcation type
concept, and the collection type concept.
Farber’s analysis imbued some much-needed historical data into the
diatribe against ‘typological thinking’ that had been launched by Ernst
Mayr and his fellow Modern Synthesis architects.1 Farber rightly
emphasized that speaking of ‘typological thinking’ as a monolithic and
backward category ‘‘does violence to the historical record and confuses
contemporary debates rather than clariﬁes them’’ (Farber, 1978, p. 91).
He showed that pre-Darwinian type-talk was not hung up on Platonic
idealism or Aristotelian essentialism, but rather involved a spectrum of
ﬂourishing empirical and theoretical endeavors.
Farber’s 1976 paper has deservedly attained the status of a classic in
the history and philosophy of biology. His account of types has formed
the backbone of many studies of late eighteenth and nineteenth century
taxonomy and morphology, and continues to be viewed as a conceptual
1 E.g. Dobzhansky (1967), Mayr (1959, 1976), and Simpson (1961). It is generally
thought that typology/population dichotomy was a purely rhetorical ploy, which Mayr
conjured up from thin air in the early 1950s (e.g. Chung, 2003; Winsor, 2006). Else-
where, I show that the actual origination history of the typology/population dichotomy
is considerably more complicated than this (Witteveen, under review[a]). It originated
with independent (and disciplined) arguments by Dobzhansky and Simpson against
distinct notions of type, used in diﬀerent methodological, conceptual, and theoretical
contexts. Mayr later swept up these individually meaningful type/population contrasts
and recombined them into a rather obscure argument against typological thinking.
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springboard for improving our grip on nineteenth century natural his-
tory.2
It is nonetheless high time to revisit Farber’s account of types, for
some things that he writes are prima facie puzzling. Take, for example,
the claim that his tripartite taxonomy of type concepts should not be
taken ‘‘[to] correspond to nineteenth-nineteenth-century deﬁnitions of
the word ‘type,’’’ since the word was generally ‘‘used in a very loose
manner’’ (Farber, 1976, p. 93). What, then, did Farber attempt to
capture with his taxonomy of type concepts? Obviously, he was not
anachronistically imposing his own categorization of type concepts on
history. Instead, Farber intended to articulate distinct interpretations
that were implicit in widespread nineteenth uses of the word, as part of
distinct constellations of theory, practice and belief.
This is illustrated by an observation Farber makes about the
confused practices of some naturalists, when viewed against the
background of type concepts that were recognized by their contem-
poraries. He notes that in the context of handling so-called ‘type
specimens,’ some naturalists were ‘‘confusing the collection type-
concept with the morphological or classiﬁcation type-concept’’ (Far-
ber, 1976, p. 107).
However, this same observation also suggests that there is some-
thing amiss with Farber’s own classiﬁcation of type concepts. For,
when Farber speciﬁes how certain naturalists confused the collection
type concept with other type concepts, he gives an account of the
collection type concept that is at odds with his analysis from earlier in
his paper. In consequence, it appears that Farber is of two minds
about what the collection type concept really amounted to, and which
practices it warranted.
I will show that this internal tension in Farber’s account originates in
an assumption that turns out to be problematic. Farber’s account is built
on the hidden assumption that early nineteenth century uses of ‘type’ had
stabilized around an array of meanings that correspond to his three type
concepts. What Farber hereby overlooks, is that certain uses of ‘type’
underwent a radical change inmeaning in this period.At the closing of the
eighteenth century, terms such as ‘type specimen,’ ‘type species,’ and ‘type
genus’ had referred to typical members of their respective taxa. They were
taxon elements that could serve as models for their respective taxa in the
practice of classiﬁcation. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, these
same terms had lost their connotation to anything ‘typical’; they now
2 E.g. Amundson (2005), Camardi (2001), Eigen (1997), Gasso´ Miracle (2008), Lyons
(1999), Stevens (1984, 1994), Varma (2009), and Winsor (2003).
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referred to the ﬁxed (and potentially aberrant), name-bearing elements of
those taxa. The nomenclatural type concept had emerged.
To recognize the nomenclatural type concept for what it is, is to
realize that there is a story to be told about how it originated.3 This
intriguing history forms the heart of this paper. I will show that the
emergence of the nomenclatural type concept was at once virtually in-
evitable and entirely incidental. It was virtually inevitable, because the
only way taxonomy could continue to be pursued in the radically
changing context of the nineteenth century was by tying names to ﬁxed
name-bearing elements. Only this method held the promise of calling to
a halt the rapid increase in synonymy – the pervasively confusing state
of one taxon being known to diﬀerent people by diﬀerent names. On the
other hand, it was entirely incidental that these name-bearing elements
would become known as ‘types.’ Moreover, this choice of terminology
invited confusion: references to ‘the type of a taxon’ became ambiguous
between a taxon’s typical element and its name-bearing element. In an
eﬀort to drive out synonymy, ‘type’ was being turned into a confusing
homonym.
Farber’s Taxonomy of Type Concepts
Before addressing the problem with Farber’s taxonomy of type con-
cepts, I will give a brief overview of the type concepts he distinguishes.
The most familiar type concept he discusses is the morphological type. It
was deﬁned as an abstract plan, schema, or blueprint of a (taxonomic)
group of organisms that picks out its deﬁning characters: ‘‘The mor-
phological type… was a plan of organization that in principle consisted
of essential elements’’ (Farber, 1976, p. 107). Farber attributes the ﬁrst
exposition of this type concept in modern history to the comparative
anatomist Louis-Jean-Marie Daubenton (1716–1800) ‘‘whose morpho-
logical descriptions of quadrupeds marked the beginning of the modern
3 As far as I am aware, Lorraine Daston is the only one who has gestured to
important parts of this history (Daston, 2004; Daston and Galison, 2007, p. 109ﬀ.),
albeit without clearly articulating the shift in type concepts. Instead, she reads the
history of the type specimen notion through the lens of a larger historical–epistemo-
logical framework (Daston and Galison, 2007). I do not have the space here to discuss
Daston’s argument in any detail, but argue elsewhere that her approach is problematic
(Witteveen, under review[b]). The constraints of her historiographical framework cause
her to overlook several key nineteenth century developments, and leads her to mis-
construe the notion of a type specimen that was being hammered out.
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science of comparative anatomy’’ (Farber, 1976, p. 100).4 As the long-
time collaborator of Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buﬀon (1707–1788),
Daubenton provided anatomical descriptions of morphological types
for his Histoire Naturelle (Buﬀon, 1749), by listing sets of exclusive and
essential morphological characters as plans on which individual species
had been constructed.
Through Buﬀon’s works, the morphological type concept started to
spread, and soon became applied to other levels of the taxonomic hier-
archy. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) applied the morpho-
logical type concept to the entire kingdom of plants through his notion of
the Urpﬂanze (Lenoir, 1978; Nisbet, 1967).5 Another example of the
deployment of themorphological type concept at a higher taxonomic level
was Georges Cuvier’s (1769–1832) division of life into four embranche-
ments, based on four fundamentally diﬀerent kinds of nervous systems.
Farber notes that, over time, diﬀerent interpretations of the morpho-
logical type were developed. Cuvier followedDaubenton in working with
a functional conception of morphological types, while others, such as
E´tienne Geoﬀroy Saint-Hilaire (1772–1844), argued that meaningful
plans had to be based on structural correspondences. Hence, the famous
debate between Cuvier and Geoﬀroy can be understood as a controversy
over the nature ofmorphological types – that morphological types existed
was not at issue (Appel, 1987). A similar debate over the nature of types
and the empirical basis on which they should be discerned arose in the
nineteenth century, when the importance of embryological evidence in the
description of morphological types became a topic of heated debate
(Lyons, 1999; Trienes, 1989). As Lenoir (1978) has pointed out, the
metaphysical status of morphological types also allowed for ﬂexibility of
interpretation: whereas Kant and Goethe considered morphological
plans to be ‘regulative types’ the laterNaturphilosophen gave thema realist
interpretation, turning them into the ‘constitutive types’ that dominated
much of nineteenth century morphology and embryology.6
The second type concept Farber distinguishes is the classiﬁcation
type. A classiﬁcation type is an exemplary member of a taxonomic
group that can be used to determine the group’s boundaries by com-
paring and contrasting it with other potential members of that group.
4 Others have traced the morphological type concept all the way back to antiquity
(Hammen, 1981; Toepfer, 2011).
5 Though, as Riegner (2013) has recently emphasized, Goethe emphasized the dy-
namic, developmental aspects of morphological types.
6 For more on the diverse historical interpretations of morphological types, see Levit
and Meister (2006), Nyhart (1995), Richards (2002), and Rupke (2009), among many
others.
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Farber argues that this was the meaning of such notions as ‘type species’
and ‘type genus’ in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.
Cuvier, for example, used classiﬁcation types at the genus-level when he
wrote: ‘‘Not being able to assign to each family an equivalent and
exclusive character, we will limit ourselves at this time to indicating
families by names derived from the most well-known genus of each
family; the genus which one can consider as the type and from which it
is easiest to form an idea of the family’’ (Cuvier and Valenciennes, 1828,
vol. I, p. 571; cited in Farber, 1976, p. 103). Buﬀon similarly made use
of classiﬁcation types at the species-level when he used the European
ﬂycatcher as a model of comparison in assigning twenty-four other
species to the same genus (Buﬀon, 1778, IV, pp. 517–518).
Farber notes that in the early nineteenth century ‘‘the use of the clas-
siﬁcation type-concept increased dramatically and became explicit rather
than implicit’’ (Farber, 1976, pp. 94–95). That is, taxonomists increas-
ingly started using phrases like ‘type (of the) species’ and ‘type (of the)
genus’ to refer to model members of taxonomic groups. This terminology
was popularized by William Whewell (1794–1866), who named the
practice of assigning and using classiﬁcation types the ‘Method of Type’:
Natural Groups are best described, not by any deﬁnition which
marks their boundaries, but by a Type which marks their centre.
The Type of any natural group is an example which possesses in a
marked degree all the leading characters of the class … The type-
species of every genus, the type-genus of every family, is, then, one
which possesses all the characters and properties of the genus in a
marked and prominent manner.
Whewell (1840, pp. xxxii, 477)
Classiﬁcation types were often used as an inductive means of narrowing
in on the description of a morphological type.7 Peter Stevens has argued
that this use of classiﬁcation types was especially prominent in botany,
as plants were often found to be insuﬃciently ‘‘morphologically
coherent’’ to allow for direct application of the morphological type
concept (Stevens, 1984, p. 169).
As with the morphological type concept, the classiﬁcation type concept
was interpreteddiﬀerentlybydiﬀerent taxonomists. Someargued that there
were deﬁnite, typical, representative members of each class in nature. This
attitude was central to the quinary theory of classiﬁcation ofWilliam John
7 It is not clear whether this was also Whewell’s view. Compare Snyder (2006, p.
157ﬀ.) and McOuat (2009, p. 221).
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Swainson (1789–1855). Together with other quinary theorists such as
William SharpMacleay (1792–1865) and Nicholas Aylward Vigors (1785–
1840), Swainson believed that animal taxa needed to be arranged in nested
‘circlesofﬁve.’Heargued that each circle hada representative typical group
embodying the highest degree of organization, from which the other four
groups of the same rankdeparted in variousways. Swainson’s classiﬁcation
type concept thuswas ‘‘a complex notion predicated on the principles of his
system of classiﬁcation’’ (Farber, 1976, p. 115).8 Whewell, on the other
hand, conceived of classiﬁcation types as being independent of any par-
ticular taxonomic theory. He emphasized the role of classiﬁcation types as
heuristic devices, stressing that ‘‘we cannot say of anyone genus that itmust
be the type of the family, or of any species that it must be the type of the
genus’’ (Whewell, 1840, p. 477).
Finally – and this will become important in a moment – Farber notes
that ‘‘the classiﬁcation type-concept also doubled as a name carrier in
nomenclature. The model species was used to determine the genus
name, so that if at a later date the genus were split or rearranged, the
group that contained the type species was given the original name’’
(Farber, 1976, p. 95).
The third and ﬁnal type concept Farber distinguishes, the collection
type concept, covers the concrete ‘type specimens’ stored in the collections
of dried plants known as ‘herbaria.’ Farber notes that, functionally
speaking, the collection type concept was ‘‘[s]imilar to the classiﬁcation
type-concept… the collection type concept served as a model and name
carrier’’ (ibid., p. 97). He nevertheless considers type specimens to form a
separate class of types, because of their tangible nature. Unlike type
species or type genera, type specimens could be picked up, preserved,
stored, labeled, displayed and exchanged. The collection type conceptwas
therefore wound up with taxidermic techniques, networks of exchange,
and natural history collections (Farber, 1977, 1980).
Types in Tension
Farber’s overall taxonomy of type concepts is summarized in Table 1. On
ﬁrst inspection, it appears elegant and parsimonious. It seems to capture
some high-level distinctions in early nineteenth century uses of the word
‘type,’ which historians are well-advised to keep apart. However, when we
give Farber’s taxonomy a closer look, an internal tension appears that
8 For a diﬀerent, late nineteenth century use of classiﬁcation types in a quinarian
context, see Coggon (2002).
SUPPRESSING SYNONYMY WITH A HOMONYM 141
raises questions about the overall coherence of his account. This tension
surfaceswhen, basedon thedistinctionshehasdrawn,Farber criticizeshow
some nineteenth century naturalists deployed the collection type concept.
Potentially, the main problem of interpretation with the collection
type-concept had to do with considering the type-specimen truely
[sic] typical of the species. There was little to recommend such a
practice. The ﬁrst description of a species was often made from an
incomplete knowledge of the full range of variation within the
species. If one argued that a type-specimen should be replaced by a
more typical specimen when additional knowledge of the species
was obtained, the entire value of the concept of the collection type-
concept [sic] as a name carrier and reference for the original
description would be lost…. [N]aturalists who wished to treat type-
specimens as typical specimens, were confusing the collection type-
concept with the morphological or classiﬁcation type-concept.
Farber (1976, pp. 105–106)
There is something odd about the criticism Farber voices here. In the
previous section we saw that Farber characterized type specimens (i.e.
collection types) as well as type species and type genera (i.e. classiﬁcation
types) as having served essentially the same roles at diﬀerent hierarchical
levels (see Table 1). He argued that all these ‘type elements’ served both as
classiﬁcatory models and as name-carriers for their encompassing taxa.
Yet, in the quotation aboveFarber backpedals ondeﬁning type specimens
as classiﬁcatory models, by stating that their ‘‘entire value’’ lay in the role
of being ﬁxed bearers of taxon names. Treating a collection type as a
model that could be replaced with a more typical exemplar is now por-
trayed as having been illegitimate and illogical.
Table 1. Farber’s taxonomy of type concepts, as outlined in the ﬁrst half of Farber (1976)
type concept morphological type classification type collection type 
definition An abstract 
representation of the 
essential features 
of a taxon
A taxon that serves 
as name-bearer and
as classificatory 
model for its 
encompassing taxon.














Farber thus leaves us with two conﬂicting accounts of what the dis-
tinction between collection and classiﬁcation types consisted in.At ﬁrst he
portrays the collection type concept as a functionally similar but prag-
matically separable kindof classiﬁcation type concept – collection types as
tangible classiﬁcation types, – but later he suggests that collection types
and classiﬁcation types were functionally at odds. Which of these ac-
counts is the correct one?
Neither is. Instead, the tension in Farber’s account signals a problem
with his overall approach towards uncovering nineteenth century type
concepts. Farber assumes that the terms ‘type specimen,’ ‘type species,’
and ‘type genus’ had stable (if implicit) meanings across the period
ranging from the late-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. In
reality, however, these terms started to take on a new meaning in the
early nineteenth century. At the end of the eighteenth century, everyone
understood ‘type of a taxon’ to refer to a typical element that could serve
as a model member for exploring the limits of its encompassing taxon. By
the end of the nineteenth century, ‘type of a taxon’ had come to refer to
the ﬁxed (and potentially atypical) name-bearer of a taxon name.
To account for the nineteenth century change in meaning of a ‘type
element,’ we need to modify Farber’s taxonomy by setting it in motion.
We need to recognize that extant type terms became associated with an
entirely novel type concept. A term like ‘type species’ evolved from sig-
nifying a classiﬁcation type towards betokening a nomenclatural type. The
same goes for terms like ‘type specimen’ and ‘type genus.’ Table 2 shows
howFarber’s taxonomy needs to bemodiﬁed in this light. A new category
of nomenclatural types is recognized at the same level as that of classiﬁ-
cation types. Each of these two categories covers the meaning of ‘type
specimen,’ ‘type species,’ and ‘type genus’ for a diﬀerent period.
Using this revised taxonomy, we can start to make sense of Farber’s
allegation that certain nineteenth taxonomists were confusing type
concepts. The point Farber was getting at, is that when taxonomists
started using the term ‘type specimen’ to refer to a ﬁxed name-bearing
specimen (i.e. a nomenclatural type specimen), this implied that such a
Table 2. A revised taxonomy of type concepts, which overcomes the tension in Farber’s account




features of a taxon
A taxon or taxon-element
that serves as classiﬁcatory
model for of its encompassing
taxon. A ’typical’ representative.
A taxon or taxon-element
that serves as name-bearer
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specimen should not be replaced with a more typical exemplar at a later
time. Doing so amounted to treating nomenclatural types as if they were
classiﬁcation types. This confusionbetween type concepts alsomanifested
itself in the use of a nomenclatural type specimen as a model for the
classiﬁcation of other specimens. Sometimes this would have worked – a
nomenclatural type specimen could be genuinely exemplary – but there
was no principled reason to always expect this to be the case. Since
nomenclatural type specimens were often designated upon the discovery
of a small sample of material from a (putatively) new species, it was quite
likely that they would be rather aberrant members of their species in the
light of later discoveries.
Apart from allowing us to improve Farber’s account, the revised
taxonomy of type concepts points to an important new explanatory
project. It raises the question how and why terms like ‘type specimen’
and ‘type species’ shifted meaning in the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury. How could these terms become detached from connotations of
typicality, and gain the new meaning of ‘ﬁxed name-bearer’? What
developments drove this change? To answer these questions we need to
delve into late-eighteenth century theory and practice of naming and
classifying, and follow their development as we reach the maelstrom of
early nineteenth century taxonomy.
From Method of Type to Type Method
Linnaeus and the Method of Type
Linnaeus (1707–1778) never wrote about types. Still, he clearly falls in
the category of those who used the classiﬁcation type concept ‘implic-
itly,’ as Farber rightly notes.9 Starting from a set of carefully selected
‘chief species’ (prima species) Linnaeus made one-by-one comparisons
with other known species in order to gradually determine the bound-
aries between genera. If the characters of a newfound species matched
those of the chief species suﬃciently well, the new species was added to
the genus, and all characters by which the two species diﬀered were
cancelled from the description of the genus.10 By iterating this proce-
9 ‘‘One can ﬁnd similar implicit classiﬁcation type-concepts in the writings of other
major eighteenth-century writers, such as Carl von Linne´’’ (Farber, 1976, p. 94).
10 Many commentators have noted that, in practice, Linnaeus frequently failed to
remove the dissenting characters from his description, because of a lack of time (Mu¨ller-
Wille, 2007; Winsor, 2003). This has enabled later authors to retrace which species he
used a prima specie (Pennell, 1930).
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dure, Linnaeus could provide increasingly accurate descriptions of the
‘natural character’ of a genus (Linnaeus, 1751, §193; Mu¨ller-Wille, 2006,
2007; Stearn, 1957, p. 37).
Linnaeus referred to this practice as the ‘method of collation’ (collatio
specierum). In theFloraLapponica, for example, he remarked that it could
not be said with certainty that the genusAndromedawas distinct from the
genus Erica until he would have ‘‘collated ﬂowers of more species from
both genera’’ (Linnaeus, 1737b, p. 126). Many later commentators have
recognized this practice as an application ofWhewell’sMethod of Type.11
The botanist Henry Knute Svenson (1897–1986) stated that from a Lin-
naean viewpoint ‘‘wemay think of genera as broadening concentric circles
such as the rings formed by pebbles thrown into water: the initial impact
representing the type species of the genus, and the resulting concentric
rings the accretion of species through historical usage’’ (Svenson, 1945, p.
291). The American botanist Francis Whittier Pennell (1886–1952) re-
marked in a similar vein that in the Genera Plantarum ‘‘each [generic
description] was prepared from a species carefully selected as typical’’
(Pennell, 1933, p. 38).12
Linnaeus emphasized that only the most seasoned taxonomists could
be trusted in their selection of classiﬁcation types (Linnaeus, 1751, p.
193). Only the expert possessed the requisite tacit knowledge for
selecting a truly typical species for each genus. Another Linnaean rec-
ommendation for the selection of classiﬁcation type species was that
they be species with putative medicinal properties.13 This is illustrated
by the fact that a large number of the species Linnaeus used as classi-
ﬁcation types for the ﬁfth edition of Genera Plantarum (Linnaeus, 1754)
are species that he had included in his recently published Species
Plantarum (Linnaeus, 1753) with the epithet ‘oﬃcinales’ – a term
denoting exemplary medicinal value with regard to some property
11 Whewell mentioned Linnaeus, Adanson and de Candolle (the elder) as examples of
taxonomists who had ‘‘practically applied’’ and ‘‘theoretically enunciated’’ what he
regarded as the ‘‘sound maxims of classiﬁcatory science,’’ which obviously included the
Method of Type (Whewell, 1840, p. 463).
12 Also see Pennell (1930, 1939). Many other taxonomists and historians have simi-
larly noticed Linnaeus’ deployment of the Method of Type (e.g. Hitchcock and Green,
1929; Stearn, 1959, 1960; Winsor, 2003).
13 Oﬃcinal species served an important role in the larger economic context in which
Linnaeus’s classiﬁcatory endeavors were situated. Ultimately, his generic classiﬁcations
served the practical goal of presenting potential substitutes for imported products, so as
to reduce dependence on trade, which he perceived as essentially parasitic on the
domestic economy (Koerner, 1999).
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common to the genus (Pennell, 1930; Ho¨vel, 1999).14 Hence, later tax-
onomists rightly observed that ‘‘the type of each genus of Linnaeus as
stated by him is ‘the best known European or oﬃcinal species’ it con-
tains,’’ (Jordan, 1901, p. 501) and that ‘‘among Linnaean genera …
such names as communis, vulgaris, typicus, and oﬃcinalis would seem to
point out typical species’’ (Hitchcock, 1925, p. 131).
Meanwhile, Linnaeus was aware that even classiﬁcations made by
experts were fallible. He realized that future taxonomists, with more
knowledge about more species at their disposal, would likely judge that
some genera were really composites, and needed to be split. Moreover,
Linnaeus perspicaciously observed that this inherent ﬁckleness of clas-
siﬁcations could have serious consequences for the stability of taxo-
nomic nomenclature. A name that was once established could all too
easily get lost in a sequence of splitting events. Or worse, diﬀerent
taxonomists might start using the same original name to refer to dif-
ferent segments of a divided taxon. Nomenclatural chaos would ensue.
In the Fundamenta Botanica, his ﬁrst collection of ideas about reform in
botanical taxonomy, Linnaeus oﬀered a solution to these problems by
means of proposing a procedural rule. Aphorism 246 of that work
reads:
If an established genus has to be split up into several, according to
the Law of Nature and Art, then the name that formerly belonged
to the whole should be kept to denote the plant that is most vulgar
and oﬃcinal.15
Linnaeus (1736, §246)
With this aphorism, Linnaeus suggested that the assignment of taxo-
nomic names be made dependent on (expert) taxonomic judgment. Any
taxonomist who would be able to ascertain the typical—i.e. vulgar and
oﬃcinal—species of a genus would also be able to apply its name cor-
rectly when splitting the genus. In other words, aphorism 246 made the
assignment of genus names dependent on deployment of the Method of
Type. Classiﬁcation types would double as name-bearers.
Linnaeus reiterated this aphorism in the Critica Botanica, warning
that ‘‘inextricable confusion would arise’’ if taxonomists would be al-
lowed to ‘‘choose indiﬀerently’’ which part of a genus to apply the
14 An oﬃcina was a building, often adjacent to a herbal garden, were medicaments
were prepared from plant extracts (Pearn, 2010).
15 ‘‘Si genus receptum, secundum jus naturae & artis, in plura dirimi debet, tum
nomen antea commune manebit vulgatissimae & oﬃcinali plantae.’’
J. WITTEVEEN146
original name to (Linnaeus 1737a, p. 99). Linnaeus’s aphorism reached
later generations of taxonomists through his widely read Philosophia
Botanica (Linnaeus, 1751). His student Johan Christian Fabricius
(1745–1808), for example, included aphorism 246 almost verbatim in his
inﬂuential Philosophia Entomologica16 (Fabricius, 1778, §30). In the
early nineteenth century, John Lindley’s (1799–1865) widely read An
Introduction to Botany made mention of the ‘‘Linnaean canon’’ that was
recognized for providing stability to taxonomic nomenclature: ‘‘If an
old genus is divided into several new ones, the old name will remain with
the species that is best known’’ (Lindley, 1832, p. 456). One would
hardly suspect that soon enough, taxonomist would reject this principle
because of its contribution to nomenclatural chaos.
Names, Meaning, and Typicality
To understand why and how aphorism 246 and its later incarnations
came under threat, we will need to make an excursion into some general
developments in early nineteenth century taxonomy. As the Napoleonic
Wars drew to close, overseas surveys and expeditions started to bring
home masses of new specimens from previously unexplored areas,
driving a rapid expansion of botanical and zoological collections in
Britain and on the continent. Naturalists who sifted through the
materials that were brought home soon discovered numerous new
species, genera, and even entire families.17 Joining the sudden increase in
specimens needing to be named and classiﬁed was an increase in tax-
onomists who wished to be involved in the naming and classifying. A
new branch of self-fashioned British provincial radicals started prac-
ticing taxonomy as a pastime, and colonial collectors began to name
species on their own (McOuat, 1996; Secord, 1994; Endersby, 2008).
The metropolitan establishment harbored more than a few reserva-
tions about the involvement of these new classes of amateur tax-
onomists in these endeavors. Imperial botanists objected that colonial
collectors tended to raise mere varieties to the status of species, and that
they did so mainly to derive prestige from introducing new names. To
the imperial experts these new names useless, redundant, and a cause of
16 ‘‘Si genus receptum, secundum leges naturae et artis, in plura dirimatur, tum nomen
antea commune vulgatissimo insecto manebit.’’
17 Whewell mentioned that ‘‘Linnaeus knew approximately 10,000 species of plants; a
few decades later this number had already swelled to 60,000’’ (Whewell, 1840, p. 489).
By the mid-1830s this number had risen sharply, as it was reported that ‘‘new species are
joined to those known to Linnaeus, in the proportion of at least 100 to 1’’ (Westwood,
1836, p. 562).
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confusion. Joseph Dalton Hooker (1817–1911), soon to become assis-
tant director of the Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew, lamented the
‘‘chaos of synonymy which has been accumulated by the thoughtless
aspirants to the questionable honour of being the ﬁrst to name a spe-
cies’’ (Hooker, 1853, xiv).18
From the side of provincial radicals, the contributions to the ‘chaos
of synonymy’ were compounded by another factor. Radical reformists
argued that many taxon names that had once been ‘expressive’ of typ-
ical and distinguishing features of taxa seemed to be rather ‘oﬀ’ in the
light of recent discoveries. Hence, a good number of Linnaean and
colloquial names needed to be replaced with more meaningful names.
Even more than the careless splitting of taxa, these arguments about
meaning were anathema to the conservative metropolitan establish-
ment.19 Apparently, the radicals had deeplymisunderstoodwhat purpose
names served. As Linnaeus had already made clear, a good name was
simply a memorable one. The ulterior value of names was entirely con-
stituted in them being good mnemonic devices. Names should therefore
not be too long, too similar to others, or be mixtures of Latin and Greek
words.20 Ideally, a name would capture the distinguishing features of a
taxon, but neither Linnaeus nor his followers considered it essential for a
name to wear its ‘meaning’ on its sleeve. ‘‘Names have the same value on
the marketplace of botany as coins have in public aﬀairs, which are daily
accepted as certain values by others, without metallurgical examination’’
(Linnaeus, 1737a, §284). Not the most expressive, but the ﬁrst (well-
formed) name given to a taxon should be counted as the rightful name for
that taxon: ‘‘priority in time confers precedence’’ (Linnaeus, 1737a, §243).
The controversy between radicals and conservatives ﬂamed up
properly over an article written by the anonymous S. D. W., who argued
that the recent discovery of a white specimen of the species ‘coalhood’
was good reason to replace its name: ‘‘With regard to the Scientiﬁc
Name of the Coalhood, I have ventured to suggest Denisirostra atri-
capilla, as being more deﬁnite and expressive than the name of Lin-
18 Hooker’s collaborator George Bentham (1800–1884) similarly proclaimed that ‘‘[i]t
is only second rate botanists who pride themselves on the number of names, good or
bad, to which their initials can be attached’’ (Bentham, 1878, p. 190).
19 For a broader and more detailed treatment of the controversies that ensued, see
McOuat (1996).
20 Generally speaking, only the improper form of an extant name (e.g. not being in
Latin, or being barbarian) would be a reason for Linnaeus to introduce a new name: ‘‘If
it is decided that none of the synonyms is really suitable for the plant, then necessity
compels us to make up a new one’’ (Linnaeus, 1737a, p. 258; cited in Dayrat, 2010, p.
189).
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naeus, Loxia Pyrrhula’’ (S.D.W., 1834, p. 593). S. D. W.’s article raised
the hackles of Hugh Edwin Strickland (1811–1853), a conservative,
Oxford-educated naturalist. Strickland quickly drafted a reply in which
he strongly objected to the idea of substituting more ‘expressive’ names
for accepted ones, ‘‘a practice which appears to me highly detrimental to
the progress of natural history’’ (Strickland, 1835, p. 36). He continued
by teaching S. D. W. and his allies some Linnaean philosophy of names:
‘‘[I]n order that the object of the speciﬁc name may be duly performed,
it is essential that a name be universally adopted, and, therefore, never,
or very rarely, altered. But it is not, I think, essential that the meaning of
the name should precisely designate the species; or, indeed, that it
should have any meaning at all’’ (Strickland, 1835, p. 38). With Lin-
naeus, Strickland also held that once a name was assigned to a species, it
should be retained as its unique and memorable marker. Only a little
reﬂection was needed to realize that S. D. W.’s alternative of ‘updating’
species names in the light of new knowledge would be unworkable:
Can S. D. W., for instance, expect that the whole republic of sci-
ence will take the trouble of relabelling their cabinets, altering their
catalogues, or making notes in their works of reference, because an
anonymous writer fancies that he can improve Pyrrhula vulgaris by
changing it to Densirostra atricapilla? Again, if some adopt the
alteration, a large number will not: and hence it is that we rarely
ﬁnd the same species labelled alike in two diﬀerent museums. In
short, if this practice be once given way to, there will soon be an
end of all nomenclature, and, through it, of all science.
Strickland (1835, pp. 38–39)
Strickland’s message was clear: ‘‘[T]he evil of changing a name… is much
greater than any advantage supposed to result from substituting a term
which is ‘more appropriate.’’’ Reformists like S. D. W. who pressed for
‘better’ names failed to appreciate that taxon names, like proper names,
are ‘‘arbitrary signs adopted to represent real things or conceptions’’
(Strickland, 1835, p. 37; italics in original). There was, in other words, a
‘‘complete parallel’’ between species names and names of men: ‘‘The ﬁrst
discoverer of a species may be regarded as its parent or godfather; who
bestows on it any namehe thinks ﬁt, andpublishes it to the scientiﬁcworld
in some standard work, as in a parish register’’ (Strickland, 1835, p. 39).
In concluding his response to S. D. W., Strickland brieﬂy noted that
his argument was not restricted to species names, but equally applied to
‘‘the proper names of genera, or of larger groups, where such groups are
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retained unaltered.’’ And if a group was altered, Linnaeus’s aphorism
246 needed to be followed: ‘‘Where an old genus is divided into several
new ones, new appellations must, of course, be found for them; but,
even then, the original name should be retained for that group which is
the most typical of the whole’’ (Strickland, 1835, p. 39). It sounded
almost like Strickland reading out the Philosophia Botanica to a new
generation of taxonomists.
In spite of Strickland’s eﬀorts, the radical reformists were not swayed
easily. When Strickland returned to the topic of nomenclature two years
after his initial bout of criticism, he noted to his dismay that ‘‘the lovers
of confusion have been hard at work,’’ and that ‘‘speciﬁc names are as
variable as the London fashions’’ (Strickland, 1837b, pp. 127, 128).
Once again, Strickland reminded the reformists that ‘‘[t]he meaning of a
name is … a point of less importance than its universality; and, when
the latter object has been once gained, would never sacriﬁce it to the
former’’ (Strickland, 1837b, p. 129). Yet by now he realized that
repeating this lesson over and over would not suﬃce. The ‘curse of
Babel’ posed by the proliferation of synonyms required a more pro-
active eﬀort on behalf of ‘‘the true friends of science to counteract this
evil tendency’’ (Strickland, 1837b, pp. 127–128). It had become high
time to compile a set of clear and authoritative nomenclatural rules, to
be accepted and followed by the entire taxonomic community. The
Philosophia Botanica was in need of an update, and Strickland took the
lead in getting the job done.
Just onemonth later, Strickland published a list of 22 provisional rules
of zoological nomenclature, which he compiled from the writings of
contemporary naturalists. Many of the rules he listed had ancestors in
Linnaean aphorisms.21 Rule 4, for example, articulated the ‘priority
principle’ of aphorism 243: ‘‘The ﬁrst name given to a group or species
should be perpetually retained.’’ Rule 9 read: ‘‘It is desirable, but not
essential, that a name should have an etymological meaning.’’ Yet the list
was clearly provisional and incomplete. It did not, for instance, include
the equivalent of Linnaeus’s aphorism 246 that Strickland hadmentioned
in his response to S. D. W. two years earlier. However, Strickland did
include another rule that tied the assignment of names to ‘typical’ ele-
ments: ‘‘Rule 18: The names of families and subfamilies should be derived
from the most typical genus in them’’ (Strickland, 1837c, p. 175).
21 Strickland later noted in correspondence that in his eﬀorts to formulate nomen-
clatural rules he proceeded by taking Linnaeus’ Philosophia Botanica and adapting it to
the demands of nineteenth century taxonomy (Strickland to Bonaparte, 30 May 1844,
SA F-170).
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Strickland’s adoption of this rule is interesting, since it amounted to a
partial departure from the purely nominalist spirit he had embraced
earlier. After all, Rule 18 eﬀectively stated that a family name should in
some sense reﬂect the family’s content. Strickland indeed adapted this
rule from the writings of the reform-minded William Swainson
(1789–1855), who had argued for the improvement of certain names.
‘‘Before we impose a name upon a group which has never been char-
acterised, we should carefully analyse it; without which we shall run no
small risk of not discovering the typical character of the whole and
consequently apply a false name’’ (Swainson, 1836, p. 235). As an
example, Swainson mentioned that ‘‘[the genus] Muscicapa being more
typical than Todus, the family to which both belong should be called the
Muscicapidae.’’22 In Swainson’s view it would be ‘‘comparatively triv-
ial’’ to carry through changes like these for existing families. ‘‘While the
whole science is undergoing a revision and correction, it may be as well
to make these and every other necessary change of nomenclature at the
same time’’ (Swainson, 1836, p. 235).
Strickland’s inclusion of Swainson’s rule suggests that he was not
trying to push his nominalist philosophy at all costs and at all taxonomic
ranks. Since, ultimately, Strickland was seeking a way to stabilize names,
he may have been swayed by Swainson’s claim that this rule was ‘‘uni-
versally acted upon in Britain’’ (Swainson, 1836, p. 235). In any case,
Strickland soon started criticizing naturalists who failed to follow the
‘‘very convenient rule nowgenerally adopted by naturalists, that the name
of a family should be compounded of the name of the most typical or best
known genus in it’’ (Strickland, 1837a, p. 605).
Yet, ‘convenient’ as this rule may have appeared, many taxonomists
would soon protest that it was far from clear how to apply it. What were
they supposed to understand by a ‘typical’ genus? typical of what, and
to whom? Assigning names on the basis of typicality judgments was far
more problematic than Strickland realized, and threatened to under-
mine his aim of stabilizing names.
22 Swainson carried this change through in a later monograph, but not without
remarking that the name ‘Todus’ had meanwhile been determined to have been mis-
applied, in such a way the correct name of the family might actually be ‘Todidae’ after
all! He nevertheless refrained from adopting the chain of nomenclatural changes that
followed from all this, since ‘‘these alterations would lead to so much confusion, that we
have not ventured upon, much less do we recommend, their adoption’’ (Swainson,
1838).
SUPPRESSING SYNONYMY WITH A HOMONYM 151
Whose Type?
One problemwith Strickland’s talk of ‘types’ and ‘typicality’ was raised in
an exchange with the Irish naturalist William Ogilby (1808–1873). When
Strickland criticized Ogilby for not following Rule 18, the latter re-
sponded that he was ‘‘at loss to imagine’’ what this rule meant: ‘‘We hear
continually of the type of such or such a genus, and of typical species,
typical groups, and typical genera. Now if the word type be merely syn-
onymous with example, I see no objection to it, but on the contrary have
employed it in this signiﬁcation myself: but it is notoriously employed by
others in a very diﬀerent sense, and one to which I confess I can attach no
deﬁnite meaning’’ (Ogilby, 1838a, pp. 281–2 82).23
The ‘very diﬀerent sense’ Ogilby referred to, was that of quinarians
like Swainson. As noted earlier (Section ‘‘Farber’s Taxonomy of Type
Concepts’’), the quinary theorists’ understanding of types or typical
elements was rooted in a particular theory of classiﬁcation, on which
types were the most perfected members in a ‘grand system’ of nested
circles of taxa. Like all other conservatives, Ogilby was strongly op-
posed to this speculative classiﬁcatory scheme. When he learned that
Strickland took his Rule 18 straight from Swainson, it must have ap-
peared to him that Strickland was importing quinary elements into his
nomenclatural rules.
Quick to recognize Ogilby’s worries, Strickland responded by
agreeing that ‘‘the quinary theorists attach to the word type, a deeper
and more mysterious meaning, but this is not the only one of their
doctrines to which I do not subscribe.’’24 In reality, Strickland’s
understanding of a ‘type’ was ‘‘precisely the same as Mr. Ogilby’s… By
‘the most typical genus’ of a family, I mean that genus which seems to
aﬀord the best sample of the characters on which the family is based,
with the least tendency to diverge into other families.’’ The same
counted for the genus level, where the taxonomist selects ‘‘that species
which aﬀords the fairest sample of the whole, [which] he calls a
type’’ (Strickland, 1838a, pp. 330–331).
23 Ogilby also protested against the idea of formulating nomenclatural rules in gen-
eral. He argued that they ‘‘make no part of zoology’’ and that there was no need to
strictly apply ‘‘these scientiﬁc thumb-screws, these verbal crucibles’’ (Ogilby, 1838b, p.
150). Strickland, of course, replied that rules of some form of regulation would be
necessary to get all naturalists to speak the same language (Strickland, 1838b).
24 At the British Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in Glasgow in
1840, Hugh Strickland also mentioned that ‘‘[a]ll systems, circular, quinary, dichoto-
mous, etc. are not natural, but artiﬁcial and only of use in arranging museums’’ (see
McOuat, 1996, p. 503, n.140).
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Strickland’s response to Ogilby evinces that he did not intend to
make taxonomic nomenclature dependent on a particular taxonomic
theory, let alone on quinary theory. On the other hand, his response
does aﬃrm that he considered the proper assignment of names to be
dependent on informed taxonomic judgment. To determine the correct
name of a genus or family, a taxonomist would have to be able to
identify its typical species or genus, respectively.
Yet this led to a further problem, raised by Charles Thorold Wood
(1777–1852) – ‘‘the most vociferous of the nomenclature radicals’’
(McOuat, 1996, p. 498). Wood pointed out that ‘‘it frequently happens,
that naturalists cannot agree on the type of the family: thus, Selby
pronounces the genus Sı´lvia to be the type of its family; Swainson says,
on the other hand, Re´gulus; and Blyth, rejecting both, adopts Fice´dula
as the typical genus… and so on throughout zoology’’ (Wood, 1836, p.
340).25 Moreover, Wood noted that aphorism 246 and its cognates were
vulnerable to the same problem:
Mr. Strickland observes, ‘‘Where an old genus is divided into
several new ones, new appellations must, of course, be found for
them; but, even then, the original name should be retained for
that group which is most typical for the whole.’’ This latter
proposition sounds well in theory, but will be found, on many
occasions, impracticable.
Wood (1836, p. 340)
Interestingly, the same line of criticism was voiced by a prominent
naturalist on the very opposite end of the radical-conservative spectrum.
John Obadiah Westwood (1805–1893) – ‘‘arguably the most vociferous
critic of nomenclature radicalism’’ (McOuat, 1996, p. 518) – illustrated
the problems with Swainson’s rule by highlighting that Swainson him-
self sometimes ‘‘considered the wide geographical range of a form as
indicating typicality,’’ but at other times ‘‘opposes this principle, by
considering the preeminently typical form to … exist in a group of
conﬁned geographic range’’ (Westwood, 1836, p. 563).
A decade earlier, Westwood had already diagnosed the root problem
with nomenclatural rules that depended on judgments about typicality.
The issue was not only that diﬀerent measures of typicality could be
used, or even that judgments on a given measure depended critically on
subjective factors. The deeper problem was that even perfectly aligned
25 In The Ornithological Guide, Wood gave more examples of families for which ‘‘there
is diﬀerence of opinion with regard to which is the typical genus’’ (Wood, 1835, p. 75).
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typicality judgments made at any time would be liable to change over
time, because of our evolving taxonomic knowledge. ‘‘Indeed, until the
contents of any particular family are clearly ascertained, the supposed
typical group will be continually subject to variation as new forms are
discovered, and hence,… the family name will necessarily be subject to
similar variation’’ (Westwood, 1828, p. 4).26
Westwood realized that the same lesson applied to any nomenclatural
rule that hinged on taxonomic judgment. Hence, like Wood, Westwood
also leveled his criticism at rules that descended from aphorism 246:
Fabricius, in his Philosophia Entomologica (p. 114) lays down the
following rule, ‘‘Si genus receptum secundum leges naturae et artis,
in plura dirimatur, tum nomen antea commune vulgatissimo insecta
manebit.’’ I do not know any method so likely to create confusion
and uncertainty as that contained in the above rule, since it is next
to impossible that every Entomologist would select the same par-
ticular insect, and consider it as the most common in the family to
which it belongs.
Westwood (1828, p. 5)
Wood and Westwood’s criticisms put pressure on the Linnaean strategy
of using classiﬁcation types to adjudicate on the application of names.
Both men realized that co-opting the Method of Type for nomenclatural
purposes would increase synonymy rather than reduce it.
Yet, as much as they agreed in their diagnosis of the problem, they
thoroughly disagreed about how to solve it. Wood took the radical
position that nomenclatural rules should be abandoned wholesale. The
establishment should stop trying to regulate nomenclature. Instead,
usage by taxonomists over time should be the standard for determining
the correctness of a taxon name. In his own work, Wood therefore often
gave ‘‘more than one name to the same family,’’ leaving his readership
to determine which of the names was ‘‘the best’’ (Wood, 1835, p. 74).
Westwood could not disagree more. He strongly favored the insti-
tution of authoritative nomenclatural rules, and concluded that a dif-
ferent set of rules would be needed to drive out synonymy. As
Westwood saw it, the problem with nomenclatural rules based on typ-
icality judgments was that they went against the grain of a principle that
26 As Hooker put it some years later: ‘‘The type of a group often turns out (on
extended knowledge of that group) to be the most aberrant form in it’’ (Hooker to
Darwin, 5 April 1844; DAR Letter 745). [I use ‘DAR’ to refer to Darwin’s corre-
spondence, collected in Burkhardt et al. (1985–).]
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should be at the heart of any set of rules: the principle of priority.
The principle of priority stabilizes naming by making it a matter of
ostension, isolating it from matters of taxonomic judgment. If the valid
name of a taxon is simply that which it has been baptized with by its ﬁrst
describer, no future change in taxonomic judgment or opinion can
unsettle it. Westwood observed that Linnaeus’s aphorism 246 and
Strickland’s Rule 18 were at odds with this separation between naming
and casting taxonomic judgments. These rules opened a backdoor
through which ﬁckle and subjective taxonomic judgments could reenter
the stage of objective nomenclature. This backdoor would need to be shut
by formulating a new principle about how to apply names to split genera.
The solution Westwood came up with was simple but ingenious. He
proposed that, apart from ﬁxing the ﬁrst name given to taxon as its valid
name, that name would have be permanently anchored to the part of the
taxon that was regarded as typical by the name-giver. In other words,
Westwood proposed to extend the principle of priority from names to
name-bearers.
If Westwood’s proposal were to be followed, names would be pre-
vented from going adrift in the inevitable merger and splitting of genera.
Changing judgments about typicality would no longer impact the
assignment of genus names, as names would ‘track’ the ostensively
speciﬁed name-bearing species. The very species which the ﬁrst describer
of a genus at ﬁrst used as his classiﬁcation type would count as the ﬁxed
point for application of the genus name.
How to call this notion of a ﬁxed, name-bearing taxon element?
Apparently without giving the question much thought, Westwood
started referring to it as the taxon’s ‘‘original type,’’ ‘‘real type,’’ ‘‘true
type,’’ or simply as its ‘‘type.’’ We thus read that a genus name should
never be ‘‘wrested from its true type,’’ at the risk of upsetting nomen-
clatural stability (Westwood, 1837b, p. 172). And in concluding his
article, Westwood summarized his use of ‘type’ by stating:
[I]t must be evident that the author, in constructing [a] genus, must
have especially have had in view the typical species, which, indeed,
often furnishes the generic name; that, by removing such type, the
creation is dissolved, the tie which held the remaining discordant
materials together is broken; and that, after the removal of that
type, it would be as improper as practically injurious, to speak of
the remainder as constituting such or such a genus of the author by
whom the name was proposed.
Westwood (1837b, p. 173)
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On the one hand, this choice of terms seemed straightforward. After all,
Westwood’s proposal was to ﬁx the typical element from the originally
named sample as the taxon’s name-bearer. But on the other hand,
Westwood’s move was bound to invite confusion. On Westwood’s
usage, a genus’ ‘type’ could be a species that had been judged typical by
its namer, but that had become an atypical – or even wholly aberrant –
member of its genus after taxonomic revision. Moreover, if an author
had not expressly stated what he considered to be the typical species at
the time of introducing the name, Westwood suggested that the name be
tied to the ﬁrst species listed under the genus name.27 Hence, the types
Westwood was speaking of did not need to coincide with any classiﬁ-
cation type ever used by anyone. To apprehend that this was not a
reductio ad absurdum of the term ‘type,’ readers would need to realize
that Westwood was not speaking of types as subjectively selectable
model members, but rather as name-bearers ﬁxed by ostension. West-
wood was speaking of ‘type’ under a diﬀerent concept: the nomenclat-
ural type concept.
The Strickland Code
Following his publication of 22 provisional rules, Strickland sought the
support of the British Association for the Advancement of Science
(BAAS) as an authoritative platform for supporting the formulation of
rules of nomenclature.28 At the 1841 BAAS meeting in Plymouth,
Strickland tried to rally support for setting up a committee charged with
this task, but he failed to get a motion passed. Undeterred, he set out to
draft a 15-page pamphlet himself, entitledProposedPlan forRendering the
Nomenclature of Zoology Uniform and Permanent (Strickland, 1841b),
which he circulated widely among naturalists at home and abroad. In the
preamble, Strickland expressed his desire ‘‘to mature the plan as much as
possible, by obtaining the opinions of eminent zoologists in various
countries; and the proposers of the measure will therefore feel grateful for
any remarks or criticisms… ’’ (Strickland, 1841b, p.1).
Meanwhile, a new request to the BAAS Council was approved,
allowing Strickland to set up a committee to prepare a proposal for the
27 ‘‘[W]here an author does not state the particular species which he regards as the
type of his genus, we are bound to suppose that he would place it at the head of his
genus’’ (Westwood, 1837b, p. 170).
28 Rookmaaker (2011) provides a detailed discussion of Strickland’s eﬀorts from 1841
to 1843. A detailed calendar and index of his scientiﬁc correspondence can be found in
Rookmaaker (2010).
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next BAAS meeting, in 1842.29 Strickland quickly formed a committee
with 16 eminent scientists, including Owen and Darwin, and also got
Ogilby and Westwood on board.30 Based on their input, Strickland
composed and distributed an updated set of rules in the spring of 1842,
entitled Proposed Report of the Committee on Zoological Nomenclature.
For the use of the members of the Committee (Strickland, 1842). These
rules were presented by Strickland at the June 1842 BAAS meeting in
Manchester. In early 1843 they were published in the Society’s Pro-
ceedings31 under the title Series of Propositions for Rendering the
Nomenclature of Zoology Uniform and Permanent (Strickland, 1843).
Before long, these rules would become known as the ‘Strickland Rules’
or the ‘Strickland Code.’32
On a cursory reading of the Strickland Code, it seems that the
committee had held fast to Strickland’s earlier ideas about naming and
typicality, in spite of counting Westwood among its members. The third
rule, for example reads as follows:
§3. A generic name, when once established should never be can-
celled in any subsequent subdivision of the group, but retained in a
29 Strickland Correspondence, University Museum of Zoology, Cambridge, N-095.
30 The other members were Bell, Broderip, Jenyns, Phillips, Richardson, Shuckard,
Smith, Waterhouse, Westwood, and Yarrell. Rookmaaker (2011) presents a useful ta-
ble, listing which of the several meetings were attended by whom. McOuat (1996)
provides an appendix with short biographies of all members, except for Whewell, who
only joined for one of the meetings, and who did not want to be considered an oﬃcial
member. Whewell reported to Strickland that all he had to say on the subject he had
already said, in the ﬁrst volume of his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (Whewell to
Strickland, 1841; Strickland Correspondence, N-096).
31 Several political and bureaucratic hurdles needed to be taken before publication in
the authoritative main section of the BAAS Report could happen, since not everyone
agreed that the BAAS should back these rules. The strongest opponent was John Ed-
ward Gray, whom we’ll meet later on. He argued that, ‘‘the rules be not adopted until
they have been compared with Linnaeus’s ‘Philosophia Botanica,’ Fabricius’s ‘Philo-
sophia Entomologica,’ Tiliger’s ‘Prodromus,’ and De Candolle’s ‘Theorie Elementaire,’
and that when they are not in conformity with the laws proposed by these authors,
which have been accepted by all recognized systematic naturalists, the reasons for the
proposed alterations should be given in detail.’’ (Gray, 1864b, p. 85). Another Gray, the
American botanist Asa Gray, agreed: ‘‘We recommend that… the Philosophia Botanica
of Linnaeus… be reprinted, with indications of the rules which in the lapse of time have
become inoperative, or were from the ﬁrst over nice’’ (Gray, 1864a, p. 278).
32 For a discussion of the Strickland Code in the Victorian societal context, see Ritvo
(1997). McOuat (1996) oﬀers an excellent in-depth discussion of the Code’s broader
political and philosophical motives and implications (see Section ‘‘Under the Radar of
Nomenclatural Codes’’).
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restricted sense for one of the constituent portions.
[Generic names to be retained for the typical portion of the old
genus.]
Strickland (1843, p. 110)
The bracketed part suggests that Strickland’s committee had held fast to
Linnaeus’s aphorism 246: a genus name should track the genus’ typical
features. However, the next rule introduced an important proviso:
When a genus is subdivided into other genera, the original name
should be retained for that portion of it which exhibits in the
greatest degree its essential characters as at ﬁrst deﬁned. Authors
frequently indicate this by selecting some one species as a ﬁxed
point of reference, which they term the ‘‘type of the genus.’’…We
submit therefore that
§4. The generic name should always be retained for that portion of
the original genus which was considered typical by the author.
Strickland (1843, pp. 110–111; italics in original)
This article testiﬁes that Westwood’s voice had been heard after all.
With ‘‘typical portion of a taxon’’ being speciﬁed as the portion that was
considered typical by the namer, it was clear that the Code did not refer
to types under the classiﬁcation type concept. The ‘type of a genus’
being described as ‘‘a ﬁxed point of reference’’ left no doubt that ‘type’
in the Code referred to the nomenclatural type concept.
The Code further anchored this new stance about naming and types
in several other articles. In §G, for example, it was recommended that
for newly described genera ‘‘one species should be invariably selected as
a type or standard of reference’’ (Strickland, 1843, p. 121).
It is not clear whether Westwood (or any of his followers)33 directly
inﬂuenced Strickland to adopt the nomenclatural type concept. In any
33 Shuckard, who also served on Strickland’s committee, was one of those early fol-
lowers. He agreed on the ‘‘ﬁxed principle’’ that whenever a genus is name and described
‘‘the type [should] be at the same time exhibited, which would insure justice being done
to the original describer, by the necessity for retaining his generic name to the type,
whatsoever might subsequently become of its congeners, upon the occurrence of new
views, or the introduction of new creatures’’ (Shuckard, 1837b, p. 250). Westwood and
Shuckard nevertheless become embroiled in a short but bitter dispute about what
should be done if the author of a genus had not clearly indicated what he considered to
be the typical species (Westwood, 1836, 1837a; Shuckard, 1837b, 1837a).
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case, it looks like Strickland already grasped its usefulness before he
composed his committee. The Proposed Plan from September 1841 al-
ready included the exact same formulation of the relevant rules.
Moreover, in February of that year Strickland already made a remark in
print which suggests that he had abandoned his earlier rule. In an essay
review of George Robert Gray’s (1808–1872) Genera of Birds, Strick-
land no longer recommended that the name of a genus that was being
split should be retained for the most typical segment of the original, but
instead stated that ‘‘an author, in restricting an existing genus, ought
always to retain the original name for that part of the old genus which
was considered as typical by its author’’ (Strickland, 1841a, p. 419;
italics mine). Textually speaking, the change was minute. Conceptually
speaking, it marked a major shift.
‘Type of a taxon’ could now mean diﬀerent things, depending on the
context. It could either be understood in the traditional sense of ‘‘an
element which is judged typical of a taxon,’’ which is to say, as the
taxon’s classiﬁcation type – the cornerstone of Whewell’s Method of
Type. Alternatively, ‘type of taxon’ could be understood as ‘‘the ﬁxed
element that anchors the name of the taxon,’’ the taxon’s nomenclatural
type, and the organizing concept of what would in due time become
known as the type method.
It was easy to confuse these two notions of ‘type,’ and to confuse the
practices they were implied in. Followers of the Strickland Code would
have to respect the designated nomenclatural types when referring to
genera that had already been named, but the Code did not require
taxonomists to use these types as classiﬁcatory models – classiﬁcation
types – for further study of those genera. The Code being a set of rules
about nomenclature, it made no provisions about what counted as
sound taxonomic judgment.
Interestingly, it seems that not even Strickland fully grasped these
implications, since he later wrote:
We may obtain a great amount of ﬁxity, in the position at least, if
not in the extent of our groups, by invariably selecting a type, to be
permanently referred to as a standard of comparison. Every family,
for instance, should have its type-subfamily, every subfamily its
type-genus, and every genus its type-species. [These types are]
examples or illustrations selected for convenience to serve as per-
manent ﬁxed points in our groups, whatever be the extent which we
may give to their boundaries.’’
Strickland (1844, p. 219; italics added)
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Here Strickland can be seen to muddle the notion of a nomenclatural
type with that of a classiﬁcation type. His reference to ‘‘standards of
comparison’’ suggests that he is talking about classiﬁcation types. Yet, a
classiﬁcation type is not a ‘‘permanent ﬁxed point’’ in a taxonomic
group, but is rather supposed to track the typical center of a group, if it
is to be a representative member of that group. A taxon element that
once served as a good classiﬁcation type may not do so any longer,
because it is judged to be atypical in the light of new taxonomic
knowledge. The only elements that need to be ﬁxed are nomenclatural
types. And because they need to be ﬁxed, they tend not to make for
good, durable standards of comparison.
Although Strickland seemingly failed to grasp this subtle distinction,
he understood that the conception of types as ﬁxed name-bearing de-
vices was a new, post-Linnaean idea. This much is evidenced by an
interesting exchange on nomenclature between him and Charles Darwin
in the late 1840s. In a discussion about the intricacies of the principle of
priority, Strickland explained to Darwin the need
to trace out the original type-species, on which, like the lineal
descendant of an ancient family, the original estates privileges &
title must be for ever entailed. That is the theory, but it happens
unluckily that a type-species is a modern idea – Linnæus & his
immediate successors considered all the species in a genus as free
and equal, and no more thought of making one species the ‘‘type’’
than a Yankee would think of making his eldest son the head of the
family.
Strickland to Darwin, 15 February 1849; DAR Letter 1226
To make sure that Darwin had understood him, Strickland emphasized
in the ﬁnal paragraph of his letter that ‘‘by type-species I only mean a
conventional distinction, referring only to words, not to things, and like
human titles, only used as a matter of convenience.’’
The Nomenclatural Type
Word of the Strickland Code spread quickly. Translations into Italian
and in French appeared almost immediately (Bonaparte, 1843; Gue´rin-
Me´neville, 1843; Anonymous, 1844), foreign societies recommended
their members to follow the Code (Dana, 1846), and extensive reviews
appeared in scholarly journals (Gould, 1843). Some taxonomists were
quick to grasp the need and purpose of the new ‘type method’ it codi-
ﬁed. The Danish conchologist Otto Morch (1828–1878), for example,
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wrote: ‘‘Linnaeus directs that, if a genus must be divided, the most
common species shall preserve the old name. This course can scarcely, in
the present day, be considered as very scientiﬁc. The author who
establishes a genus alone has the right to decide which species he wishes
to be regarded as the type, and to interpret the meaning of his generic
name’’ (Morch, 1858, p. 136). Most taxonomists, however, failed to
notice that the Strickland Code attached an entirely novel meaning to
talk of ‘types.’
Exemplary in this regard is the response from Louis Agassiz, who
compared Linnaeus’s nomenclatural aphorisms with the Strickland Code
in the introduction of hisNomenclator Zoologicus, a massive work listing
all generic names used from Linnaeus to his day. In evaluating §3 of the
Strickland Code, Agassiz remarked ‘‘this rule does not depart from Lin-
naeus’s §246,’’34 and thus overlooked that Strickland was actively
departing from this Linnaean canon (Agassiz, 1842–1847, p. xx).35
There were also those who did notice Strickland’s departure from
Linnaeus, but who were hesitant to follow in his footsteps. This is
especially clear in the ﬁrst botanical code of nomenclature, drafted by
Alphonse de Candolle (1806–1893) – son of Augustin Pyramus – on
request of the 1867 International Botanical Congress, and modeled on
the Strickland Code. De Candolle wrote:
According to Linnaeus, the name of the genus should rest with the
most common species and that which is oﬃcinal (vulgatissimae et
oﬃcinali), an equivocal rule in all those cases where one species is
most common and another oﬃcinal. Subsequent authors tend to
say that, the name should stay with the oldest known species, those
forming the original type, etc., but it is impossible not to take into
account the relative number of species.36
Candolle (1867, p. 60)
Hence, if one part of a divided genus contained many more species than
the other part(s), de Candolle argued that the largest part should inherit
34 ‘‘Haec lex a §246 Linnaei non discrepat.’’
35 Even more confusingly, Agassiz continued by stating about §4 and §5: ‘‘Hae duae
leges necessariae factae sunt, ex quo antiqua genera in inﬁnitum dividi coepta sunt.’’
36 ‘‘D’apre`s Linne´, le nom du genre divise´ doit rester a` l’espe`ce la plus commune et a`
celle qui est oﬃcinale (vulgatissimae et oﬃcinali), expression e´quivoque dans tous les cas
ou` il y a une espe`ce tre`s-commune et une autre oﬃcinale. Les auteurs subse´quents
disent, en ge´ne´ral, qu’il faut laisser le nom aux espe`ces le plus anciennement connues, a`
celles formant le type ancien, etc., mais il est impossible de ne pas tenir compte du
nombre relatif des espe`ces.’’
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the original name, even if another part contained the ‘original type’
(Candolle, 1867, §54). This demonstrates that although de Candolle did
understand a ‘type’ to be a ﬁxed element, he did not want to always
privilege it as a taxon’s name-bearer.37
Gradually, however, the nomenclatural type concept found its way
into many of the other, specialized codes of nomenclature that sprouted
in the second half of the nineteenth. The Kiesenwetter Code of Ento-
mological Nomenclature (Kiesenwetter, 1858), the Report on Nomen-
clature in Zoology and Botany commissioned by the AAAS (Dall, 1877),
the American Ornithologists Union Code (Coues et al., 1886), and the
French Zoological Society’s Re`gles Applicables a la Nomenclature des
Eˆtres Organise´s (Blanchard, 1881, 1889): all of them included rules that
(explicitly or implicitly) concerned the ﬁxation of names by means of
designated nomenclatural types.38 The wording of these codes generally
made clear that the ‘types’ at issue were not to be regarded as typical
from a present point of view, and some emphasized this by speaking of
the ‘type ancien,’ ‘type originaire,’ ‘original type,’ or the ‘type of the
primitive genus.’ Yet most codes just stuck with the simple ‘type,’
‘Typus,’ or ‘typical form’ – terms that could easily be mistaken to refer
to classiﬁcation types.
The confusion over the meaning of ‘type’ endured in the late nine-
teenth century. In a discussion on nomenclature in entomology, the
Dutch taxonomist Pieter Snellen reported that he ‘‘completely rejected
the system of generic types [i.e. type species],’’ since he did not think that
any species of a genus could be singled out as more typical than another
(Snellen in Durrant, 1898, p. 312). Another entomologist immediately
pointed out that Snellen was confusing two senses of ‘type’: ‘‘A genus as
a systematic idea has no type … from a practical and nomenclatorial
point of view, however, the name must always be connected with a
certain species’’ (Aurivillius in Durrant, 1898, p. 312).
Around the same time, the geologist Francis Bather warned of the
‘‘danger that needs constant guarding against, namely, the employment
37 Here de Candolle was essentially following his father, who had similarly remarked
‘‘Si un botaniste reconnaıˆt qu’un genre doit eˆtre divise´ en plusieurs, il doit conserver
l’ancien nom, ou au groupe le plus nombreux en espe`ces, ou a` celui dans lequel se
trouve l’espe`ce qui l’a primitivement rec¸u’’ (Candolle, 1813, pp. 236–237; Candolle,
1819, p. 266). It is noteworthy that the elder de Candolle did accept the nomenclatural
type concept in the context of species names (see Section ‘‘Aﬃxing Labels, Fixing
Names’’).
38 For general discussions of the development of nomenclatural codes (mostly focused
on ‘priority’), see Linsley and Usinger (1959), Melville (1995), Knapp et al. (2004), and
especially Nicolson (1991) and Dayrat (2010).
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of a common word in a restricted or altered technical sense. The man in
the street knows the meaning of ‘type’ and ‘typical,’ but the meaning of
those terms to the zoologists something quite diﬀerent … [Types] are
often aberrant forms, i.e., are not typical in the ordinary English sense’’
(Bather, 1897, p. 844). Bather was even willing to completely constrain
the meaning of ‘type’ to that of ‘nomenclatural type.’ He argued that,
with regard to classiﬁcation, ‘‘the word type has been stolen from us,’’
and needed to be replaced with something like ‘norm’ (Bather, 1897, p.
844). On the European continent it was similarly noted that ‘‘The dif-
ference between the historical and the natural type – i.e., between the
taxon element that happened to be described ﬁrst and the taxon’s actual
centre – is often completely overlooked’’ (Kobelt, 1904, p. 147).39
Only in the twentieth century did some revised codes of taxonomic
nomenclature start to make explicit reference to ‘nomenclatorial types’
or ‘nomenclatural types.’40 By the 1920s, a popular textbook on sys-
tematic botany could open with the warning: ‘‘A nomenclatural type
must not be confused with a biological type. The latter is a represen-
tative of the group to which it belongs; the former determines the
application of a name’’ (Hitchcock, 1925, p. 129).
Type Specimens in Transition
Under the Radar of Nomenclatural Codes
Thus far, we have seen how the nomenclatural type concept emerged at
the level of type species and type genera. But what about type specimens?
Whewell never mentioned types below the species level in his discussions
of theMethod of Type, nor did the Strickland Code extend the new type
method towards the naming of species. The notion of a ‘type specimen’
was indeed conspicuously absent from the vast majority of nineteenth
century discussions about types. The ﬁrst nomenclatural code to apply
the type method below the level of species was the American
Ornithologists Union Code (Coues et al., 1886). And it took until the
39 ‘‘Den Unterschied zwischen dem historischen und dem natu¨rlichen Typus, d. h.
zwischen der zufa¨llig zuerst beschriebenen Form eines Kreises oder einer Formenkette
und dem tatsa¨chlichen Mittelpunkte derselben, wird meistens vo¨llig u¨bersehen.’’
40 E.g. ‘‘The application of a name is determined by reference to its nomenclatorial
type’’ (Arthur et al., 1907, §4), and ‘‘The application of names of taxonomic groups is
determined by means of nomenclatural types. A nomenclatural type is that constituent
element of a group to which the name of the group is permanently attached’’ (Briquet,
1906, §8).
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twentieth century before many other codes began to include articles on
types qua specimens. How come?
The reasons for this ‘delay’ needs to be sought in a mix of practical,
theoretical, political and institutional factors. Consider ﬁrst the practi-
cal complications in applying the nomenclatural type concept below the
species level. Because of their tangible, collectible nature, specimens
could be displaced, lost in exchange, eaten by moths, perish in drawers,
or get discolored through sunlight. Hence, before the invention of
reliable taxidermic methods, it was practically impossible to perma-
nently aﬃx names to individual specimens. The very possibility of
‘ﬁxing’ nomenclatural type specimens depended on technology.
On a theoretical plane, we ought to realize that the lion’s share of
nomenclatural issues generated by the splitting and merging of taxa
took place above the species level. The boundaries of genera had been
resculpted incessantly since the days of Linnaeus, and the new classiﬁ-
cations that had cropped up – with Lamarck, Cuvier, and the quinar-
ians – tended to leave species boundaries largely untouched.
Finally, the stability of species boundaries were actively policed by
means of institutional politics. As Gordon McOuat has pointed out,
naturalists in powerful positions in the British Empire used their
inﬂuence to ban discussion of species circumscriptions in various ways
(McOuat, 1996, 2001). One tactic, for which the Strickland Code set the
example, was to actively exclude the topic of splitting species from the
rules of nomenclature. ‘‘For the Rules, species were just what competent
(read: institutional, published, gentlemanly, conservative) naturalists
said they were’’ (McOuat, 1996, p. 512). Where species boundaries
could be set, with institutional ﬁat, by a small group of experts, there
was little reason to provide communal guidelines for the naming of
divided species. The establishment did the naming for the rest.
Another tactic was mastered at the British Museum, where a zealous
assistant (and later Keeper) of the Zoological Department, John Ed-
ward Gray (1800–1875), came up with a system of cataloguing that
turned museum curators into the guardians of species limits. In the
catalogues that were published under Gray’s guidance, each species was
assigned a separate leaf under which all its known specimens in the
Museum were listed. Gray allowed that ‘‘in any future time the leaves
may be separated and bound in any other form,’’ so as to ﬁt new
systems of classiﬁcation (Parliamentary Papers, 1836, §2500, p.195). But
the leaves themselves – the species – could not be ﬁddled with. Species
thus became the museum’s stable ‘base units,’ which outsiders could not
split, merge, or rename. Through this ‘‘little legerdemain of standard-
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ization’’ species were both ‘made’ and ‘protected’ at the Museum
(McOuat, 2001, p. 4; also see Thomas, 2012). Again, there was no
reason to anchor species names to nomenclatural types.
However, each of the dimensions I have touched on – practical, the-
oretical, and political-institutional – also had its ﬂip-side. In the course of
the nineteenth century, the ﬁxation of nomenclatural type specimens be-
came possible from a practical point of view, prestigious from an insti-
tutional point of view, and pressing from a theoretical point of view.
Together, these changing parameters explain how the notion of a ‘type
specimen’ went through the same transformation in meaning as ‘type
species’ and ‘type genus.’ Once having signiﬁed a classiﬁcation type, ‘type
specimen’ came to refer to the nomenclatural type of a species.
Aﬃxing Labels, Fixing Names
Linnaean taxonomic practice once again forms a natural starting point
for tracing out the transformation at issue. As we saw earlier (Section
‘‘Linnaeus and the Method of Type,’’ Linnaeus used classiﬁcation type
species to set limits to genera, by means of ‘collating’ typical species
with others. It should be noted, however, that indirectly this practice
also relied on classiﬁcation type specimens. The reason is that Lin-
naeus often used a typical specimen of a typical species as its proxy. In
the Hortus cliﬀortianus, for example, Linnaeus mentioned that he had
determined through ‘‘collation with a specimen [received] from Sher-
ard’’ (Linnaeus, 1737c, p. 167; cited in Mu¨ller-Wille, 2003, p. 475) that
a certain new species belonged to an already known genus. Hence,
rather than using a composite image or description of a typical species
a classiﬁcatory standard, Linnaeus typically used a typical specimen as
its stand-in.41
To make this practice possible, a large repository of typical speci-
mens was needed. Linnaeus therefore accumulated a large stock of
specimens through collection and trade, and stored this material in
several herbaria – large cabinets used for ﬁling sheets with dried plants
specimens on them.42 Linnaeus’s use of herbaria made them into more
41 Classiﬁcation type specimens played less of a direct role in determining the
boundaries of species. Linnaean species were usually based on a synthesis of data
derived from descriptions by predecessors, illustrations, experiments with living plants,
and comparisons with typical specimens (Svenson, 1945; Clarke, 1894; Mu¨ller-Wille,
2001).
42 When, after Linnaeus’s death, his herbarium cabinets were sold to the Linnean
Society of London, they reportedly contained some 14,000 dried typical specimens
(Mu¨ller-Wille, 2006).
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than mere repositories for specimens (Mu¨ller-Wille, 2006). By virtue of
harboring one (or at most a few) typical specimens for each named
species, the sheets in a herbarium implicitly marked the boundaries
between species. To sustain and improve this function, Linnaeus often
swapped damaged or decayed specimens for fresh exemplars, and
sometimes substituted more typical specimens for ones that in the light
of new knowledge appeared somewhat aberrant. As for the replaced
specimens: ‘‘Linnaeus sometimes gave [them] away when they had been
replaced in his herbarium by better representation of the species con-
cerned’’ (Pennell, 1939, p. 380).
These practices demonstrate that Linnaeus’s ‘typical’ specimens were
nothing like our modern ‘type’ specimens. Linnaeus’s inclination to
replace original specimens with more typical exemplars at a later date
made it possible for a species name to wander from one species to what,
by the judgment of later taxonomists, was another species. Taxonomists
who have studied Linnaeus’s herbarium have indeed noticed that
‘‘Linnaeus sometimes replaced an earlier gathering by a later conspeciﬁc
with it in his opinion though not necessarily so, according to ours’’
(Stearn to Jarvis, 1969; quoted in Jarvis 2007, p. 44).43 It would there-
fore be a mistake to think of the specimens in Linnaeus’s herbarium as
nomenclatural types for the names he coined. ‘‘Linnaeus never desig-
nated any specimens as [nomenclatural] type. Whether his description
was based on one single or on several specimens, it cannot even be
taken for granted that [these] were preserved in his collection’’ (Lin-
droth, 1957; also see Kirby, 1892). It has even be said that those who
mistake Linnaeus’s herbarium specimens for nomenclatural type
specimens ‘‘seem to have lost their sense of proportion. Great as
Linnaeus’s opinion of his own work was – with abundant reason – it is
foolish to imagine that he could ever have anticipated the importance
that future botanists would place on his specimens’’ (Svenson, 1945, p.
380).
The Linnaean practice of treating original specimens as substitutable
exemplars was still common in the early decades of the nineteenth
century. Museum curators and collectors showed little hesitation in
replacing the specimen(s) on whose basis a species had ﬁrst been named
and described with other specimens ‘‘whenever the old ones became
faded or were damaged by insect pests’’ (Mayr, 1969, p. 368). A mu-
seum curator who understood his job would promise visiting naturalists
43 The same had already been noticed in the mid-nineteenth century: ‘‘Linnaeus
subsequently introduced into his herbarium … a totally diﬀerent plant’’ (Harvey and
Sonder, 1865, p. 361).
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to ‘‘certainly… in time exchange the bad [original] specimens for better
ones’’ (Wiedemann, 1818; cited in Zimsen, 1954, p. 6).
Gradually, however, several prominent taxonomists started pointing
to the nomenclatural ramiﬁcations of these practices. In the The´orie
e´le´mentaire de la botanique, Augustin-Pyramus de Candolle pointed out
that
One of the principle beneﬁts that science draws from herbaria, is
the ﬁxity they give to nomenclature; with their aid, one can always
ascertain which is the plant that served as the type for the
descriptions of original authors, and thus avoid mistakes that can
result, either from the accumulation of erroneous synonyms, or
from defects or omissions in the descriptions.44
Candolle (1819, p. 321)45
As a practical advice, Candolle recommended taxonomists to comple-
ment their descriptions of new species with a reference to a properly
labeled ‘‘type de l’espe`ce,’’ to be permanently stored in a collection
(Candolle, 1819, p. 323). Candolle here clearly used ‘type’ in the sense of
‘nomenclatural type,’ the ﬁxed name-bearer of a species name.
Candolle was aware that the nomenclatural need to ‘ﬁx’ specimens as
name-bearers had a practical downside. It impelled botanists to invest in
drying, storing and labelling original specimens carefully, so as to pre-
serve them for the long haul. De Candolle realized that ‘‘all these pre-
cautions are punctilious and may appear almost mechanical,’’ but he
maintained that ‘‘it is only through them that the prodigious number of
plants, that we continue to discover, can be described and recognized
without confusion’’ (Candolle, 1819, p. 323).
Although the preparation of plant specimens for long term storage
was a tedious eﬀort, it could be done. However, for most animal
specimens no similarly reliable taxidermic methods were available.
Birds, for example, would be damaged when stored in alcohol, and were
likely to be eaten by insect pests when dried. That is what happened
with the collection of Sir Hans Sloane (1660–1753), the founding col-
44 L’une des principales utilite´s que la science retire des herbiers, est la ﬁxite´ qu’ils
donnent a` la nomenclature; on peut toujours retrouver avec certitude, par leur secours,
quelle est la plante meˆme qui a servi de type pour le´s descriptions des auteurs originaux,
et e´viter ainsi les erreurs qui peuvent re´sulter, soit de l’accumulation des synonymes
errone´s, soit des vices du des omissions des descriptions.
45 It is worth noting that this paragraph was absent from the ﬁrst edition of de
Candolle’s book (Candolle, 1813). This might indicate that he had only become aware
of the need to ‘ﬁx’ specimens as name-bearers in the late 1810s.
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lection of the British Museum (Natural History). In the early twentieth
century, it was reported that ‘‘not a single specimen of bird from the
Sloane Collection now exists in the Museum. All have perished.’’ Many
other eighteenth century collections had similarly ‘‘fallen to pieces’’
(Sharpe, 1906, 79–80).46 Only with the invention and spread of reliable
taxidermic procedures around the 1830s could animal specimens be
preserved for more than a few years (Farber, 1977; Johnson, 2005).47
And yet, there was still a gigantic obstacle ahead. To actually
authenticate, isolate, label, preserve and store these specimens would
require considerable resources. Realistically, only large museums and
botanical gardens would have the people, facilities and funds to
undertake the eﬀort. But what could motivate them to do so?
Creating Value
To answer this question, we need to return to John Edward Gray and
the British Museum. As I mentioned earlier, there is a sense in which his
innovative system of cataloguing removed the need to preserve original
specimens for use as ﬁxed name-bearers. Using Gray’s system, species
names were anchored to individual pages, not to any of the specimens
listed on those pages. Nevertheless, Gray realized that there were good
other reasons to take special care of the large gatherings of original
specimens in the Museum’s collections. He was acutely aware that,
along with the catalogues, these specimens could be recruited to increase
the Museum’s power and prestige.
Gray sketched his attitude towards original specimens in the dozens
of catalogues that were published under his auspices from the early
1840s onwards.48 In each of these catalogues Gray included a brief
introduction in which he accentuated the ‘‘peculiarly fortunate’’ posi-
tion of Museum as the recipient of many specimens on whose basis ‘‘the
species to which they belong were originally described, or … in which
they ﬁrst received their names.’’ Gray emphasized that these specimens
were of special value, since ‘‘there can be no doubt of the specimens
being ascertained representatives of the names they bear’’ (e.g. Gray,
46 The same held for collections at other museums. By 1844, more than half the
collection of Fabrician specimens of Coleoptera held in the Kiel Museum had been
‘‘sehr zerfressen’’ (Hagen in Zimsen, 1964).
47 Johnson (2005) mentions this as a reason for the ‘‘almost complete lack of types
from between 1758 and 1815’’ in the 3-volume index of type specimens of birds in the
BM(NH) (Warren, 1966; Warren and Harrison, 1971, 1973).
48 An incomplete list of catalogues published under Gray’s guidance is given in
Thomas (1906, p. 66).
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1843, p. vi; Gray, 1844, p. v). Gray’s introduction was sometimes fol-
lowed by a list of collections from which the Museum had acquired
these ‘type specimens,’ ‘types of the species,’ ‘original specimens’ or
‘authentic specimens,’ as he variously called them.
Gray’s commitment to preserving original specimens could already
be heard some years earlier, when he appeared before a Parliamentary
Committee that investigated the aﬀairs at the BM in 1834. One of the
many questions ﬁred at Gray was when, in his opinion, the Museum
ought to recognize a new species or genus which had been described in
print. Gray answered:
There is one test of the value of such divisions, the importance of
which is universally admitted, while it is seldom that an opportu-
nity is given to apply it; I mean the placing in the National Col-
lection type specimens of the objects described, authenticated by
their authors. Such specimens, with the names attached and so
authenticated, would always remain open to future investigators,
and would supply the deﬁciencies which occur even in the best
ﬁgures and descriptions, and which, by rendering doubtful what
has been done before, contribute much to embarrass science with
repetitions of the same object under new and varying names.
Parliamentary Papers (1835, §3345, p. 240)
The point about ‘authentication’ was essential. Not just any old speci-
men, but only those specimens which had been used in naming and
describing species were of special value; even if they were not repre-
sentative of the typical characters of the species.
The latter point was also driven home by zoologist Nicholas A. Vigors
(1785–1840), when he appeared before the same Parliamentary Com-
mittee two years later. Vigors was asked whether ‘‘A very inferior speci-
men of the giraﬀe, for instance, would be valuable in a national collection,
if it were the ﬁrst specimen introduced into Europe for the last 15 cen-
turies?’’ He answered that there would be ‘‘nothing scientiﬁc’’ about
including it in the collection formere historical reasons. ‘‘[B]ut if it was the
ﬁrst specimen that had been described by a particular zoologist, I should
then, as a type of his description, and the very example fromwhich he took
his characters, preserve it as most sacred’’ (Parliamentary Papers,
1836, §1315, p. 111). Vigors clearly understood ‘type’ in the sense of an
original specimen, and not in terms of a typical one.
The value that was attributed to these original type specimens is
underscored by the changing attitude towards ‘duplicates’ that started
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to take hold. In Linnaean times, the notion of a ‘duplicate specimen’
had applied symmetrically: two collected specimens of the same species
counted as duplicates of each other, and any specimen in a set of
duplicates could be traded with another museum. This changed when
original specimens acquired a special status qua originals. A duplicate
specimen became a duplicate of the original specimen.
The diﬀerence in value between originals and duplicates was illustrated
by the remarks of anatomist John Flint South (1797–1882), yet another
scientist who appeared before the Parliamentary Committee. In a back-
and-forth about the value of specimens in the collection, South told the
Committee that ‘‘it is useless load theMuseumwith four or ﬁve individuals
of the same species.’’ This prompted a question from aCommitteemember
about whether he considered it important ‘‘to preserve the identical speci-
men ﬁrst discovered as historical evidence… however inferior the original
specimen?’’ South: ‘‘Certainly; and in such case I consider it right that it
should be marked as the ﬁrst specimen discovered, and by whom, and at
what date’’ (Parliamentary Papers, 1836, §§1156, 1175ﬀ.; pp. 99–100).
Meanwhile, Gray developed a strategy to dispose of duplicates that
would simultaneously increase the value of the originals. He envisioned
the BM as a hub for the ‘authentication’ of specimens in a national
network of provincial museums and collections. The Museum’s original
specimens being the nomenclatural types, they could be used as refer-
ence standards for labeling the duplicates in other collections. Gray
therefore proposed to the Trustees that the Museum to start selling
‘‘series of duplicates properly selected and named … to the diﬀerent
local institutions’’ (Gunther, 1980, p. 221).49
Not all duplicates could be given away, though. Even the BM needed
duplicates to furnish its displays with, since original specimens were too
valuable for that purpose. ‘‘Such specimens ought especially to be
preserved in such a way as to be least liable to injury from exposure to
light, dust, or other extraneous causes of deterioration; and this is best
done by keeping them in a state least exposed to these destructive
inﬂuences, instead of in the open cases of a public and necessarily
strongly lighted gallery’’ (Gray, 1864b, p. 77).50 This required a shift in
49 McOuat (unpublished) has pointed out that this was part of Gray’s more general
program of middle-class reform. Gray wanted local institutions to compete on the ‘open
market’ for the acquisition of duplicates – a market for which the BM set the standards
through its nomenclatural type specimens.
50 The logician William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882) later reiterated Gray’s point,
stating that ‘‘by far the largest part of the biological collections should be packed in
draws, and only the most distinct and typical specimens exposed to view’’ (Jevons,
1883, p. 70).
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mindset from that adopted ‘‘some forty years ago,’’ when curators had
thought it desirable to mount every specimen in the collections for
public display. Buttressing the new attitude towards original specimens
was a request for government funding Gray had made in the late 1850s,
for the purpose of storing ‘‘the type specimens described by various
authors, [as] they may be considered, in a scientiﬁc point of view, as
invaluable; and if these specimens are not very shortly removed to a
dryer place, they will be utterly destroyed’’ (Parliamentary Papers,
1858, p. 4).
‘‘A Crime Against Science’’
Gray’s eﬀorts at the BMhelped to spread the idea that original specimens
should be preserved, and should function as ﬁxed anchors for species
names.51 Yet, much like in the case of type species and type genera, old
terminology obscured the new philosophy of type specimens. Gray him-
self, for example, often alternated talk of ‘type specimens’ with talk of
‘typical specimens.’ In the mid–1850s, he reported with pride:
The extent to which the description of the Museum’s collection has
been carried on has rendered it the greatest store house of typical
specimens, from which very large numbers of species of animals of
all classes have been described, so that the consultation of the
collection has now become absolutely necessary to the naturalists
of all parts of the world, who may be desirous of extending the
domains of their science, and fairly knowing what has been before
recorded and described.
BritishMuseumAnnualReport, (1854); cited inGunther (1975, p. 111)
Where Gray spoke of ‘typical specimens’ he was referring to the
nomenclatural type specimens. Undoubtedly, many of these specimens
possessed the typical characters of their species, and in this light his talk
of ‘typical specimens’ was warranted. But it was also confusing and
problematic, since even an indisputably atypical original specimen could
still serve as a nomenclatural type specimen. As long as a nomenclatural
51 A testimony to the importance of nomenclatural type specimens is a section on
‘Types in the Collection’ in an early twentieth century history of the zoological col-
lections at the BM. It mentioned that ‘‘the value of type-specimens, and the index which
their possession gives to the importance of a Museum, are now so universally recognized
that a few lines may be devoted the richness of the British Museum in this respect’’
(Thomas, 1906, p. 64). The same work also singled out J. E. Gray as ‘‘the real maker of
the collection’’ (p. 2).
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type specimen could be placed reliably within the boundaries of one
species only, it could do its job of naming that species.
Gray was not an exception in using ambiguous language. Many
other naturalists similarly spoke of ‘type’ and ‘typical’ specimens
interchangeably and with diﬀerent meanings. Joseph Dalton Hooker
noted about ‘type’ that ‘‘the word is often used in a vague and
unphilosophical manner: in the too frequent sense of the term it denotes
that individual of a species which was ﬁrst cultivated, described, ﬁgured,
or collected, or that form which is most abundant in the neighborhood
of the writer’’ (Hooker, 1853, p. xvi).52
Hooker’s friend Charles Darwin (1809–1882) shared his scruples
about type talk. Having noted that ‘‘there is … so much vague in the
meaning of ‘typical forms,’53 he turned to Hooker and George Water-
house (1815–1898) for help. They replied by concurring that the terms
‘type’ and ‘typical’ were being used equivocally, to refer either to (an
exemplar of) the most common form or to a most perfected one.54
Adding to Darwin’s confusion was a later letter from his botanist friend
Asa Gray (1810–1818), who remarked that ‘‘Our choice of what to take
as the typical forms very often is not free. We take, e.g. for one of them
the particular form of which Linnaeus, say, happened to have a speci-
men sent him, and on which he established the species.’’ More generally,
Gray noted that ‘‘The form which ﬁrst comes & is described & named…
sticks as the type, tho, in fact it may be far from the most common
form.’’55 At this point Darwin seems to have thrown in the towel,
writing to another correspondent of his that ‘‘with respect to Typical – I
observe that Naturalists use it in two very diﬀerent senses; hence I have
almost entirely or entirely avoided its use.’’56
52 Moreover, Hooker considered none of these uses to capture the meaning of a
‘true type,’ which (to him) referred to ‘‘the originally created form of any plant.’’
About this form the naturalist could have ‘‘no clue whatever’’ since a plant’s past
typical state need not coincide with its present typical state. Hooker thus concluded
that, theoretically speaking, ‘‘the type is a phantom’’ (Hooker, 1853, p. xvi). In a
sense, Hooker herewith applied Wood’s and Westwood’s criticism of talk about
‘‘typicality’’ to the species level. (For more on Hooker on types, see Endersby (2008, p.
160ﬀ.) and Stevens (1994, p. 150)).
53 Darwin to Hooker, 31 March 1844; DAR Letter 744; DAR Letter 1934.
54 Hooker to Darwin, 5 April 1844; DAR Letter 745; Waterhouse to Darwin, 26 april
1844; DAR Letter 748.
55 Asa Gray to Darwin, early August 1856; DAR Letter 1934. A little later Gray
repeated the same point in print: ‘‘Aﬃxing of a name to a suﬃcient specimen in dis-
tributed collections… [will] more surely identify the genus or species than might a brief
published description!’’ (Gray, 1864a, p. 279).
56 Darwin to Woodward, 6 March 1860; DAR Letter 2724.
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The foregoing shows that, by the mid-nineteenth century, talk of
‘types’ and ‘typicality’ invited as least as much confusion at the level of
specimens as it did at the level of species and genera. Similarly, it was
only in the ﬁnal decades of the century that the distinction between
classiﬁcation and nomenclatural types was made more explicit. Al-
phonse de Candolle was among the ﬁrst to state clearly that ‘‘the
expression ‘type’ or ‘typical sample’ (echantillon typique) is … used
incorrectly for the specimen described by its author. One should say
‘authentic sample’ (echantillon authentique). Sometimes the ﬁrst sample
described departs from the average, or the type of the species’’ (Can-
dolle, 1880, pp. 51–52). In a discussion of Blanchard’s Re`gles (see p. 22)
at the 1889 International Congress of Zoology it was similarly remarked
that ‘‘we should clarify the meaning that is assigned to the word ‘type’
or ‘typus.’ Currently, this word is used in very diﬀerent senses in the
everyday language of naturalist,’’ one of them being ‘‘the specimens on
which the ﬁrst description of a species was based’’57 (Oberthu¨r, 1889, p.
476).58
At the closing of the century, confusion over the meaning of the term
‘type specimen’ appears to have cleared. The generally recognized def-
inition of a type specimen as a ﬁxed name-bearing specimen was now
clearly stated in journal articles and the prefaces of catalogues: ‘‘By a
‘type’ is meant the original specimen to which any generic or speciﬁc
name was ﬁrst assigned’’ (Hughes, 1891). ‘‘A ‘TYPE SPECIMEN’ is the
specimen of an insect from which the original describer drew up the ﬁrst
description of a species; and it is often of great importance to settle
disputed points of nomenclature… for if we are certain that we have the
original specimen before us, no further dispute is possible’’ (Kirby,
1892, p. 244).
The value of original specimens qua nomenclatural types was simi-
larly recognized clearly, in proclamations to the eﬀect that ‘‘there can be
but one type [which] no museum can aﬀord to part with … Typical
specimens are quite another matter, and the more distributed the better’’
(Lucas, 1897, p. 544). To treat a type specimen like any other specimen
had come to be seen as irresponsible, if not outright criminal: ‘‘The
exhibition in glass cases of type specimens of animals injured by light –
as birds and mammals – indicates a disinterestedness amounting almost
to criminal neglect’’ (Merriam, 1897, p. 732). It was equally ‘‘a crime
57 ‘‘Actuellement ce meˆme mot, dans le langage ordinaire des naturalistes, est applique´
dans des sens tre`s diﬀe´rents … On dit aussi: ‘la collection X contient beaucoup des
types,’ c’est-a`-dire d’e´chantillons ayant servi a` la premier description d’une espe`ce.’’
58 For more on the discussion of Blanchard’s Re`gles, see Dayrat (2010, pp. 213–214).
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against science’’ to remove the name tag from an original specimen and
to attach it to another one. A kind of crime which ‘‘in olden times little
thought was bestowed on.’’ Modern taxonomists, however, were ex-
pected to recognize ‘‘the importance, I may almost say the sacredness,
of the ‘original label’’’ (Hartert, 1918, p. 5).59
Typicality Redux
In the early twentieth century, this understanding of type specimens also
began to make its way into a number of new nomenclatural codes. The
American Code of Botanical Nomenclature stated unambiguously that
‘‘the nomenclatorial type of a species or subspecies is the specimen to
which the describer originally applied the name in publication’’ (Arthur
et al., 1904, §14).60 The First International Rules of Zoological
Nomenclature included recommendations on the deposition of type
specimens in museums (ICZN, 1905).
However, just at about the time that the meaning of type specimens
as nomenclatural types seemed to have been anchored in nomenclatural
codes, the meaning of the term was strained once again. For, although
most taxonomists agreed that type specimens in the role of name-
bearers ‘‘are of necessity unique’’ (Holmes, 1896, p. 56), a minority
began to use the term slightly more liberally.
The British, BM(NH)-based zoologist Oldﬁeld Thomas (1858–1929)
already noted in the late nineteenth century that ‘‘The word ‘type’ itself
when ﬁrst introduced was meant to refer to the particular specimen (in
the singular) originally described, but it soon was naturally applied to
any individual of the original series, if more than one specimen was
examined by the describer’’ (Thomas, 1893, p. 241). Thomas was of the
opinion that there was ‘‘little cause for confusion’’ in this extended use
of the term. Yet he noted that it did get problematic when ‘type’ was
given an even broader interpretation. Recently, authors had started
using ‘type specimen’ to refer to ‘‘any individual from the collection of
59 The enduring value of types is also illustrated by the complete segregation and
separate storage of type specimens that was being realized. When Britain declared war
on Germany in September 1939, over 85% of type specimens at the BM(NH) had
already been packed and readied for transport to the Zoological Museum at Tring
(Warren, 1966, p. iv).
60 However, the Americans failed to convince their European colleagues of the im-
portance of this paragraph at the International Botanical Congress held in Vienna, in
June 1905 (Arthur et al., 1907). Much to the chagrin of the Americans, the First
International Rules of Botanical Nomenclature continued to be modelled on de Can-
dolle’s Code from 1867.
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the original author, obtained no matter how much later,’’ and to
specimens collected from the same locality as the original. These uses of
the term were ‘‘certainly liable to give rise to inconvenience and con-
fusion,’’ and needed to be cleared up. To do so, he suggested to dis-
tinguish between ﬁve diﬀerent kinds of type specimens:
A Type is a single specimen either unaccompanied by others at the
time of description, or else deliberately selected as such by the
author out of a series.
A Co-type is one of two or more specimens together forming the
basis of a species, no type having been selected. No species would
have both type and co-types, but either the former, or two or more
of the latter.
A Para-type is a specimen belonging to the original series, but not
the type, in cases where the author has himself selected a type. It
should, however, be one of the specimens mentioned or enumerated
in the original description.
A Topo-type is a specimen simply collected at the exact locality
where the original type was obtained.
A Meta-type is a specimen received from the original locality after
the description has been published, but determined as belonging to
his own species by the original describer himself.
Thomas (1893, p. 242)
On Thomas’ scheme, a type specimen was no longer simply a name-
bearer; only one kind of type specimen now counted as a name-
bearer. Type specimens of other kinds were in some sense ‘typical’ of
their species. Little did Thomas realize that this amounted to opening
Pandora’s box once again. Thomas’ attempt at clariﬁcation threa-
tened to reintroduce the problem of marrying taxonomic naming to
taxonomic judgment.
Soon, the pages of Science began to ﬁll with suggestions for other
kinds of type specimens that needed to be distinguished, and with other
type-terms that needed to be added to Thomas’ list. The American
paleontologist Charles Schuchert (1858–1942), for example, suggested
to rename Thomas ‘type’ into ‘holotype,’ and introduced ‘plastotype,’ as
the term for an artiﬁcial specimen moulded directly from any of the
originally ﬁgured or described specimens. He mentioned that the latter
term could in turn be compounded into ‘hypoplastotype’ for a specimen
molded from a non-original specimen. Schuchert had clearly let go of
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the idea that type specimens were name-bearers above anything else, as
he stated that ‘‘For a clear description of a new species a paleobotanist
may require as many individuals as there are specimens selected for
study, all of which are regarded as types’’ (Schuchert, 1897, p. 637; italics
mine).
Schuchert’s fellow countryman C. Hart Merriam (1855–1942) pro-
tested against the ‘‘apparently incurable form of mania’’ among natu-
ralists who coined new type-terms. In an attempt to cure the disease by
an appeal to reason, Merriam emphasized the ‘old’ lesson that ‘‘type
specimens… should from the nature of the case be single, not multiple,’’
since ‘‘in a considerable percentage of the cases where several specimens
have been used as types, subsequent study has shown these specimens to
belong to diﬀerent species. Is not this fact alone an unanswerable
objection to the existence of more than one type specimen of a species?’’
(Merriam, 1897, p. 732).
Schuchert could agree with Merriam in principle, but not in practice.
He admitted that although ‘‘the practice of selecting a single example as
the type … has its advantages, since all doubt is thus removed when a
new species is later found to contain diverse elements,’’ this advantage
was trumped by the fact that virtually no species ‘‘living or extinct, can
be deﬁned from a single individual; hence a multiplicity of types is
generally a necessity’’ (Schuchert, 1905, p. 8). By now, Schuchert had
come to discriminate between no less than 18 kinds of type specimens
(Schuchert and Buckman, 1905).
In the years that followed, the terminology of types exploded. In
1933, a list of no less than 233 (!) type-terms was published (Frizzell,
1933), which included entries such as
HOLOPARALECTOTYPE – a specimen from the original material, later
established as a paratype, that belongs to the sex described by the
author.
Ironically, the author of the list mentioned that he had excluded ‘‘ab-
surd terms’’ such as para-adelfo-allopara-andro-lipo-mimo-paraedoeo-
type; a ‘hypothetical’ term for a specimen ‘‘that was included in the
original collection; was used as basis for the original description; that is
of the same sex (male) as the allotype [a specimen with the opposite sex
of the holotype]; shows the genitalia; is characteristically absent from
certain faunas; and is analogous to certain unrelated forms in other
countries’’ (Frizzell, 1933, p. 639).
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When, in 1939 another list was published with ‘only’ 108 type-terms
that were (supposedly) actually being used (Fernald, 1939), two
prominent taxonomists stood up to reiterate Merriam’s objections,
aiming to end the avalanche of type terminology.
In Britain, the entomologist Carrington B. Williams (1889–1981)
mocked Fernald’s list by noting that he had found ‘‘no word in [it] for a
photograph of a cast of an abnormal larva of a worker of a social
hymenopteron, which has been compared with specimens from the same
locality as the type. It should, I believe, be: ‘‘Photo-plasto-terato-nepi-
ono-ergato-homotopo-type,’’ but perhaps I am wrong’’ (Williams,
1940, pp. 623–624). More seriously, however, Williams made a plea to
restrict use of ‘type specimen’ to purely nomenclatural ends.
The object of the type is to eliminate from nomenclature the pos-
sibility of human error, the personal equation, and private opinion
and this object is defeated if more than one type is designated. As
soon as a second specimen appears opinion is brought in. If I
designate ‘cotypes’ or ‘paratypes,’ or any of the hundred or so
others listed by Fernald, I imply my belief that these specimens are
co-speciﬁc with the type. My opinion may be sound or unsound,
but it is an opinion … As long as the original single ‘type’ exists,
such specimens as these can never be the ﬁnal argument for
nomenclature. Always in them is expressed the scientiﬁc opinion of
the limits of a species and hence the possibility of uncertainty.
Williams (1940, p. 622)
In the U.S., the same lessons were spelled out at great length by George
G. Simpson (1902–1984), a rising star in paleontological taxonomy.
Simpson diagnosed the problem with the expansive type terminology as
stemming from the idea that ‘‘somehow there is a limited suite of
specimens that really represent or give rise to the species, hence must be
‘types,’ while others, although they belong to the species, do not andhence
are not ‘types’’’ (Simpson, 1940, p. 422). Yet, he continued, this
assumption was entirely unwarranted. A proper inference about the
boundaries of a species ‘‘should be based on all the available specimens
that are then considered as belonging to the species and on all of them
equally.’’ Whether a specimen had been described in the original publi-
cation, or had been collected at a later data was irrelevant. All specimens
in the known sample should have equal weight in inferences about species
limits. ‘‘[T]here is nomystic virtue in ‘types,’ as such, thatmakes them any
better for comparison than would be any other member’’ (Simpson,
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1940, p. 420). Hence, taxonomy could do entirely without the expansive
terminologyof non-nomenclatural type-terms, ‘‘an irregular framework –
it cannot be called a system – that is approaching the fantastic’’ (Simpson,
1940, p. 421).
Simpson agreed with Williams that the only use for ‘type’ was that of
signifying a name-bearing specimen. He therefore proposed to retain
only those few compound type-terms that referred to name-bearing
specimens. This meant that apart from ‘type’ (or ‘holotype’) there re-
mained a use for such terms as ‘lectotype’ (a name-bearing specimen
selected from an original sample from which no holotype has been
selected by the ﬁrst describer of the species) and ‘neotype’ (a substitute
name-bearer for a lost lecto- or holotype).61 All other type-terms could
easily be discarded.
The eﬀorts by Williams and Simpson paid oﬀ. Almost twenty years
later, it was noted that ‘‘The whole scheme… of diﬀerent kinds of types
… collapsed like a house of cards in 1940 when George Simpson pub-
lished his short but epoch-making paper on ‘Types in modern taxon-
omy’’’ (Dunbar, 1959, p. 911; also see Romer, 1959, p. 919).62 Around
the same time, a small set of nomenclatural type-terms was also
included in the major nomenclatural codes that are still in use today,
such as the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature (Ride,
1999) and the International Code of Nomenclature for Algae, Fungi,
and Plants (McNeill et al., 2012).
Conclusion
In Linnaeus’s day and age there was little reason to anchor names to
ﬁxed taxon elements. Names and classiﬁcations were ‘made’ and dis-
seminated from a few high seats, and were accepted on the authority of
their authors. Their status quo was upset by the nineteenth century
expansion of taxonomy, which saw a rapid increase in collected mate-
rials, techniques, and, above all, practitioners. Existing classiﬁcations
were disrupted, and in the waves of change taxon names became aﬂoat;
61 The notion of a ‘neotype’ raises further philosophical issues. For discussion of these
intricacies, see Simpson (1945), Haber (2012) and Witteveen (2015).
62 Meanwhile, Simpson himself continued to correct confused (or careless) tax-
onomists who wrote things like ‘‘the closer the description [of the species] comes to
ﬁtting the holotype exactly, the better the picture one can obtain of the typical specimen
of the species’’ (Shenefelt, 1959). Simpson response: ‘‘[T]ypes are not typical; description
of a specimen does not describe or deﬁne a species; and the proper function of a type
(‘holotype’) is solely that of name-bearing’’ (Simpson, 1960).
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diﬀerent authors started applying the same names to diﬀerent taxa and
diﬀerent names to the same taxa.
In the introduction to his Code, Strickland captured what had
happened, and what was at stake:
The world of science is no longer a monarchy, obedient to the
ordinances, however just, of an Aristotle or a Linnaeus. She has
now assumed the form of a republic, and although this revolution
may have increased the vigour and zeal of her followers, yet it has
destroyed much of her former order and regularity of government.
Strickland (1843, p. 107)
Restoring regularity required regulation. And even though classiﬁca-
tions could not be stabilized by decree, names could. Taxon names
could be stabilized by anchoring them to taxon-elements, so that even if
classiﬁcations would remain in a state of perpetual ﬂux, each recognized
taxon would have a deﬁnite designation.
To this day, the hierarchical anchoring of family names in genus-
elements, genus names in species-elements, and species names in speci-
mens, provides stability to naming in the face of ever-changing classi-
ﬁcations. Following this method, any two taxonomists can agree on the
correct name for any given taxon, regardless of their disagreements
about its limits.
It is an artifact of history that this method has become known as the
‘type method,’ despite the fact that name-bearing ‘types’ are not re-
quired to be typical. It took some time for this message to sink in, but by
the mid-twentieth century it could be said that ‘‘no [taxonomist] will fail
to understand an author writing, e.g., ‘It is unfortunate that the bio-
logical average of Planta vulgaris is poorly represented by the specimen
in the original publication.’… It is manifest that the type-specimen and
the biological type of the same aggregate may thus be at odds’’ (Croizat,
1953, p. 124).
However, to the non-expert the notion of a ‘type specimen’ continues
to prompt unwarranted connotations of typicality. Even in news reports
for a journal like Science we still read that ‘‘as new specimens … are
found, they are deemed part of a known species, a new species, or even a
new genus based on how closely they resemble the type specimen’’
(Pennisi, 2001, p. 2304).
In an enduring eﬀort to stamp out this confusion, taxonomists have
come up with various alternatives for ‘type’ that do not invite associa-
tions of typicality: ‘standard element’ (Green, 1925), ‘testimonium’
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(Dennler, 1939), ‘index,’ ‘nominal element’ (Williams, 1940), ‘ono-
matophore’ (Simpson, 1940), ‘nomenifer’ (Schopf, 1960), and ‘ono-
myphoront’ (Dubois, 2005). Ironically, taxonomy has thus been
burdened with numerous synonyms for a notion that was invented to
drive out synonymy.
And yet, none of these alternatives for ‘type’ have caught on.63 All
current nomenclatural codes and virtually all taxonomists continue to
speak of ‘types’ when they talk of name-bearers. What counts for taxon
names therefore also holds for the modern notion of a ‘type’: it does not
carry its meaning on its sleeve. Therefore, it needs constant reminding
that Whewell’s Method of Type and the modern type method are
similar in name, but not in nature. Whewell’s types represented nature,
our types represent names.
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